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RECENT DECISIONS
DomeSTIC R-LATIONS--DIVORCE--DuRATION AND TERMINATION op DacanE PoR
SUPPORT-VTHER ErN'oRcEABr OUT or FATHER'S ESTATE UPON HIS DEAT.Robinson v. Robinson et aL, ....IV. Va., 50 S. E. (2d) 455 (1948). On August
26, 1943, Laura G. Robinson was awarded a divorce from W. E. Robinson, and
it was decreed by the court:
And it appearing to the Court that the defendant has voluntarily agreed
to pay the sum of $45.00 per month for the support and maintenance of
said children, ... it is adjudged, ordered and decreed that the defendant
pay unto said plaintiff for said support and maintenance of said children
the sum of $45.00 per month ... and that such payments shall continue
until further order of this Court.
W. E. Robinson died testate in 1944 before either of the two children provided
for in the decree reached majority, the bulk of his property going to R. W. Robinson, a son by a previous marriage. As administrator of the estate, R. W. Robinson found that he could not dispose of certain real estate owned by the deceased
because the Federal Housing Authority regarded the divorce decree as a continuing
lien upon the real estate. He brought this action to have the decree cancelled and
declared null and void, so that he might profitably dispose of the property. A
demurrer to the complaint was filed on the grounds that the decree was a final
one and became res judicata and could not be disturbed, save by a bill of review
or petition filed in the same court wherein it was rendered; that the lien imposed
by the decree was a valid and subsisting one upon the real estate described in the
complaint. The demurrer was sustained in the circuit court and the court on its
own motion certified the ruling to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
The ruling was reversed and the cause remanded.
The question of whether a divorced father's estate shall remain liable for the
support and maintenance of the children after his death has proved a vexatious
one for the state courts. To narrow this point, it can -be said that the claim
for maintenance out of a divorced father's estate may arise in one of three ways:
by agreement separate from the decree, by a decree into which an agreement may
or may not be merged, and finally by the common law obligation of the father
toward his children in the absence of an agreement or decree.
As to the first, there is no dispute since it is general law that the obligation
based on a contract does not terminate upon the promisor's death, where the contract is not based on personal services of the promisor. RESTATEiMNT, Co=PAucrs
§ 459 (1932). An English case, specifically in point, held that a promise for valid
consideration of weekly payments in a separation agreement was not discharged
by the death of the promisor. Kirk v. Bustance, [1937] A. C. 491. Similarly, the
third does not cause any difficulty, for it is generally recognized that the common
law obligation of a father to support his minor children ends with his death. MADDEN, DOmeSTIC RETIONS § 115 (1st ed. 1931). This doctrine was also recognized
in both the majority and minority decisions of the instant case. The claim based
on a decree then, is the type which has given rise to the controversy.
In the instant case, the court felt that sustaining this claim would violate the
children's statutory right of inheritance where the father died intestate, because
such a ruling would prefer one child over another; further, upholding the claim
would be encroaching on the statutory and common law right of a person to
dispose by will of his property as he wished subject only to the dower right of
the spouse in the real estate of the decedent, and his or her right to participate
in the distribution of the decedent's personal estate. The court also took cognizance of the difficulties involved in settling an estate upon which there would
be a lien that could conceivably be attached for a period of fifteen or more years.
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Finally, it was recognized by the court, that under the statutes and decisions of
West Virginia, the rights of creditors are superior to any claim that the minor
children may have for support out of the estate of their parents. It was the
opinion of the majority that the adoption of the rule contended for by the defendants would "in many cases place the entire estate of the decedent beyond the
reach of his creditors" and that "there simply is no law which would authorize
such a procedure. . . ." The court claimed that it Was not disturbing the final
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction but was merely interpreting it.
To find precedents for such reasoning the court had to search beyond the cases
decided within its jurisdiction, there being none strictly in point. Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. .41 (1927), involved a similar situation, except that
the divorce was awarded to the husband rather than to the wife. Holding that a
husband under these circumstances should not be denied his right of testamentary
disposition, the court refused to construe the statute which provided that the
court may at any time after the original decree "annul, vary or modify the same,"
in derogation of the common law, which ends the parent's obligation at his death,
or invalidates the parent's right of testamentary disposition. Another similar case
was Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So. (2d) 704 (1947), wherein the court
decreed that the weekly payments for the maintenance and custody of the children
should begin at a certain time, but omitted any statement as to when they should
cease; even the so-called ambiguous phrase of the West Virginia Court of Common Pleas, "until further order of the court," was lacking. In view of the indefiniteness of the order, the Florida court would not uphold the claim.
Two other cases cited in support of the ruling of the majority were clearly
distinguishable. In Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 N. E. (2d) 728 (1940), the
husband obtained a divorce from his wife. The custody of the child was awarded to the maternal grandmother and the decree ordered the father to pay certain
amounts for its support and maintenance. When the wife died, the grandmother
sued for payments accruing after the wife's death. In rendering its decision the
court said:
But when such a decree has been entered, upon the death of one of
the parents, the divorce decree ceases to have any further continuing effect, at least when, as here, the decree makes no provision for its continuance beyond the lives of the parents . . . When the divorced wife of the
defendant died there was no longer any effective decree of court depriving the father of the custody of the child and relieving him from the common law duty to support it. Defendant's common law right to custody
of his child revived and his obligation to support it again arose when
the divorce decree became ineffective upon the death of the mother.
Thus, in effect, the court substituted the common law obligation for the one arising out of the decree. Whether it would have extended its ruling so as to deprive
the child of the means of support it gained out of the divorce decree upon the
death of the father is a matter of conjecture, since that question was not before
the court. The distinguishing feature of Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43 S. W.
(2d) 498 (1931), was that there was no provisiofi for support made in the decree;
it merely awarded the wife a lump sum for alimony and gave her custody of the
children, but it made no statement concerning their support. The Tennessee court
made note of the fact that there were authorities that held that a definite provision for support by the father would be enforceable after his death out of his
estate, but they could find none that so held when there was not such definite
provision. In denying the claim, the court said, "The common law obligation
terminates with the death of the parent." Judge Haymond, in his dissenting
opinion in the instant case, considers this point:
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Of course the last sentence contains a correct statement, in absence
of a decree imposing the obligation of support which by virtue of the decree would survive against the estate after his death; but that statement
has no application to the question of the effect of the decree which arises
in the case at bar.
Judge Haymond continued in his dissent literally to charge the majority with
wreaking havoc with West Virginia law. He logically points out that by statute,
W. VA. CODE AN. §§ 3761-3762 (1943), the decree was a judgment, that by statute, W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3766 (1943), this judgment became a valid lien upon
the real estate of the decedent. "The lien having arisen by virtue of the judgment
it continues until judgment is discharged in some legal manner ... It does not
cease to be a lien because of the death of either party and may be enforced at
equity without revival." Thus there is a difference between the duty of a father
and the effect of a judgment based on that duty. The duty in absence of any
adjudication terminates upon death, the judgment does not. judge Haymond
cited Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 53 S. E. 769 (1906), wherein the plaintiff sued
the estate of her divorced husband for alimony awarded her by decree which
was to accrue after his death. In that case -the court reasoned that every judgment for money rendered in West Virginia became a lien on all real estate of or
to which the judgment debtor was entitled after the date of such a judgment. The
court remarked, "The only question is whether future installments are a lien. We
think they are." In Hale v. Hale, 108 W. Va. 337, 150 S. E. 748 (1929), a similar
case, the court, basing its decision on an early statute, stated:
Our statute Code 64 § 11, clothes the chancellor with vide power in
making such a "decree as it shall deem expedient, concerning the estate
and maintenance of the parties, or either of them, and the care, custody
and maintenance of the minor children." We think this'is of sufficient
breadth to warrant a requirement by the trial court that permanent alimony be paid out of a husband's estate after his death, when in the
chancellor's opinion, such course is just and right. [See W. VA. CoDn
ANN. § 4715 (1943)]
In considering these cases, the majority attempted to make some distinction between alimony and "care, custody and maintenance of minor children," although
the same statute was the source of the court's power to decree either or both.
In refutation of the majority's argument about the rights of creditors, the dissenting judge maintained that the children became judgment creditors by virtue
of the decree. In conclusion, judge Haymond declared, in a tactful manner, that
he seriously dcubted whether the decree as set down by the court of common
pleas was in need of "interpretation."
Aside from incurring the lengthy dissent of Judge Haymond, the majority
placed themselves in the unenviable position of adopting the minority view on
this issue. In addition to the states represented by the instant case and the four
cases cited by the majority, only Kentucky and New York have put themselves
on record as being opposed to the enforcement of the decree after death. Sandlin's
Adm'x v. AUen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S. W. (2d) 350 (1936); Carry v. Estate of Johnson, 295 N. Y. 857, 67 N. E. (2d) 260 (1946). New York, however, places a
great deal of importance on the definiteness of the decree and the intent of the divorced husband. In an alimony case, Babcock v. Babcock, 174 Misc. 900, 265
N. Y. S. 470, aff'd, 239 App. Div. 384, 265 N. Y. S. 474 (1933), the court said:
When a decree of a court of this state fixed alimony at a certain
amount pursuant to the agreement of .the parties, to continue during the
life of the wife, the alimony did not cease upon the death of the husband, but could be collected from his estate during the life of the wife.
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A more recent case involving the validity of a decree for alimony after the death
of the husband, Daggett v. C. I. R., 128 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 2nd 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U. S. 673, 63 S. Ct. 78, 87 L. Ed. 540 (1942), states:
New York courts have no power to decree alimony for the life of a
wife so as to bind the husband's estate in the event he predeceases her,
because the husband's marital duty of support is upon him only during his
lifetime . . . But a husband may voluntarily consent, either by way of
separation agreement or through a decree of court, to make periodic payments to the wife for support during her life, and in that event, should
he predecease her, his estate will be held legally responsible for the remainder of the wife's life.
At least nine cases have held that the statement "until further order of the
court" is definite enough to enforce payment out of the estate of installments that
accrue subsequent to the death of the father. Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874) ;
Creyts v. Creyts, 143 Mich. 375, 106 N. W. 1111 (1906); West v. West, 241 Mich.
674, 217 N. W. 924 (1928); Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P. (2d) 511
(1932); Garber v. Robitshek et al, 226 Minn. 435, 33 N. W. (2d) 30 (1948);
Myers v. Harrington, 70 Cal. App. 680, 234 Pac. 412 (1925) ;In re Estate of Smith,
200 Cal. 654, 254 Pac. 567 (1927); Silberman v. Brown, 72 N.E. (2d) 267 (Ohio
Com. P1. 1946); Edelman v. Edelman, .-..
Wyo....., 199 P. (2d) 840 (1948). In the
Creyts and Newman cases an order was obtained determining the value of the in-

stallments until the time the child reached majority, and payment in a lump sum
was decreed. In addition, there are cases which hold that a decree providing for

periodic payments during the minority of the child is enforceable against the estate.
Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913); Murphy v. Moyle,
17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010 (1898); Smith v. Funk, 141 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638

(1930).

The underlying reason behind all these decisions is -the court's solicitude

for minor children, who, through no fault of their own, have been forced to live
away from one of their parents.
It is to be noted that the instant case is the only recent one which rejects the
definite trend of courts to hold a divorced father's estate liable for the maintenance
of a minor child when there has been a decree issued providing for periodic payments. Certainly such a doctrine is moral; a minor child should have the right to

look to those who brought him into the world for support, especially when that
child has been subjected to the humiliation and vicissitudes of separated parents.
The arguments of the majority in the instant case would seem feeble in light of
the effects of a contrary decision. The difficulties involved in distributing the
estate would be no more than those involved if, instead of a decree, the estate
were bound by a valid contract. Such situations are common. The argument that

the rights of creditors would be infringed upon has already been answered by the
fact that the child is actually a judgment creditor. As to testamentary disposition, "a man must be just before he is generous." Silberman v. Brown, supra.
Sidney Baker

ToaRs-PRox1arn CAusm--Ex osiss.-Kingsland et al. v. Erie County Agr.
Soc. et al., ... N. Y.,
84 N. E. (2d) 38 (1949). The chain of causation is not
broken when independent intervening forces, reasonably foreseeable, cause the injury complained of. This was the basis on which the Court of Appeals of New
York refused to disturb a jury verdict rendered for the plaintiff in this case.

The plaintiff's brother, aged thirteen, a trespasser on the defendant's fairgrounds, pilfered a "ground bomb," a powerful type of fireworks, which subse-
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quently caused plaintiff's injury. Between the time of the asportation and the
explosion, the boy's mother saw the "bomb." It is doubtful whether she was
aware of its dangerous propensities. However, she did know it was an explosive,
though she believed it to be a dud, and she* told her boy she didn't want it in
the house.
Is the theory of liability for foreseeable consequences of intervening causative
forces as predicated in the present case grounded merely on dispassionate legal
analysis; or is it, rather, based upon unexpressed considerations of public policy?
A comparison of the instant case with Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 60,
113 N. E. 529 (1917), on which the dissenting opinion principally relied, indicates
the uncertainty with which the courts of New York have approached the problem.
In the Perry case, several boys discovered hidden nitroglycerin caps in an unlocked
chest, stole a box of the caps and carried it to their home a half mile away,
where a playmate subsequently was killed by an explosion of the caps. In the
instant case the fireworks were wrapped in paper in an open box. The boy took
one home and the next day an infant brother was injured. Yet in the Perry case
and the instant case opposite results were reached. The acts of the boys in the
Perry case were considered independent intervening forces. In the instant case,
however, the stealing of the deadly fireworks, the knowledge of the mother and
injury to the plaintiff were held reasonably foreseeable; hence the leaving of the
explosive concealed in the box was the proximate cause of the injury. The court
based its decision on the manner in which the explosives were stored. Is this distinction warranted on the facts; or is this "public policy" digging in the deepest
pocket?
Another case which appears to be contra to the instant case is Babcock v.
Fitzpatrick, 221 App. Div. 638, 225 N. Y. S. 30 (1927), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 608, 162
N. E. 543 (1927). Workmen had left dynamite caps under the porch of a house
near where they were working. The caps were visible from the road and a
nephew of the owner of the house carried them away and distributed them among
his friends. In attempting to light the fuse on one of the caps an injury was
sustained. In that case the court of appeals held the acts of the nephew to be
unforeseeable intervening forces.
"Proximate cause" is the limitation which the courts have been compelled to place, as a practical necessity, upon the actor's responsibility for
the consequences of his conduct. The limitation is sometimes one of causation, but more often is one of various considerations of policy which
have nothing to do with causation. [PRossER, TORTS 311 (1941).]
With this in mind, it can be well understood that causation cannot be reduced
to an equation so long as there remain so many variables.
Other jurisdictions have been perplexed with the same problem. The Massachusetts court in Bruso v. Eastern States Exposition, 269 Mass. 21, 168 N. E. 206
(1929), directed a verdict for the defendant when evidence disclosed that four
days after a fireworks display, a boy of thirteen found an unexploded part of a
piece of fireworks from which he extracted the explosive powder and was injured
when he poured the powder on an open fire. The same court, in Horan v. Town
of Watertown, 217 Mass. 185, 104 N. E. 464 (1914), held that the negligent keeping of dynamite in a box near the street was not the proximate cause of injuries
inflicted when boys who had taken some dynamite from the box were injured by
an explosion which resulted from their throwing it on an open fire.
However, the other extreme was expressed by the Circuit Court of the Sixth
District in Bridges v. DaM, 108 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 6th 1939). This court
held that causation was a question for the jury when the facts showed that a boy
fifteen years of age had stolen dynamite and fuses from an open garage and was
injured in firing the explosives.
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These cases illustrate that the only approach to questions of causation is
through the cases. A general statement that
. . . in order that an act or omission may be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission and such as might have been foreseen by an ordinary reasonable prudent man, in the light of the attendant circumstances, as likely to
result therefrom,
as stated in CooLEY oN TORTS § 32 (Rev. Stud. ed., Throckmorton 1930), can at
best be useful only as a charge to the jury. The fictictious "ordinary reasonable
prudent man" test prevents any degree of certainty.
The "substantial factor" test was applied and liability imposed in a case where
lightning had struck a barge in which the plaintiff was working, causing an explosion of the gases negligently left therein. Johnson et al v. Kosmos Portland
Cement Co., 64 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th 1933). In another case, a Massachusetts court stated that the intervening acts of a third person which create a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligent act will not excuse the first wrongdoer; this rule was applied where someone other than the
gas station attendant left the cover off of a coil and a spark ignited vapors which
were present because of the negligence of the gas attendant in filling the gas tank.
Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 226 Mass. 25, 164 N. E. 612 (1929). Even a test
long believed dead was revived fairly recently to plague the courts when the "last
human wrongdoer" test of Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East 1, 103 Eng. Rep. 245 (1806)
was applied by the House of Lords in the case of Singleton Abbey v. Paludina,
[1927] 1 A. C. 16.
These cases indicate the futility of attemping to formulate any general rule
as to intervening forces and causation. The underlying forces behind these negligence cases are many, but they are conveniently classified under one heading, public policy.
Arthur L. Beaudette

Rni PRoPERT-PREscPmnTvE EAaSENTs oF WAY-PEuSU PTON OP PERMIsSv US.--Wi[sO v. Waters et al.... Md., 64 A. (2d) 135 (1949). This
action was brought to recover damages against an owner of a suburban lot for
barricading a "country lane" crossing her property. The four plaintiffs claimed a
prescriptive right of way by having used the roadway to the rear of their houses
for well over the statutory period of twenty years. Defendant resisted the claim
of an easement, maintaining that the user was not adverse or exclusive, but permissive, since the property had been "unenclosed and unimproved" prior to 1934,
twelve years before the barricading, and in any event the use was "in connection
with permissive use of the general public."
The court found that there were no legal presumptions upholding the contention of permissive user so that the plaintiffs' evidence of their open, continuous,
and unobjected use was sufficient in itself to presume adverse use, and, in the absence of any affirmative evidence by the defendant showing permission, the use
established a prescriptive easement.
In ruling that there were no legal presumptions of permissive use, but that a
presumption of adverse use had arisen, the court has brought into focus two
scintillating and vigorously controversial points: (1) Can a presumption of permissive use be predicated of urban property, and if so, what is the proper test?
(2) What effect does the public use of a way have on the right of an individual
who originally established the way, and claims a prescriptive easement over it?
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The court examined the general rule of presumption of permissive use which
is applied to the user of "unenclosed" rural land, Bowman v. Wickliffe, 15 B.
Mon. 84 (Ky. 1854); Boyden v. Achenbach, 86 N. C. 397 (1882), former app.,
79 N. C. 539 (1878); Trump v. McDonnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353 (1898);
17 Air. JuR., Easements § 71, but criticized the use of the word "uinenclosed,"
adopting as the test the far more satisfactory term "unimproved," Worrall v.
Rhoads, 2 Whart. 427 (Pa. 1837) (by implication); Shepard v. Gilbert, 212 Wis.
1, 249 N .W. 54 (1933) (by implication), especially as a test for urban property.
See Note, 170 A.L.R. 820 (1947). The court makes an unexplained distinction between unimproved "wild land, woodland, and other land in the general state of
nature" and unimproved urban property having a depth of 150 feet, peremptorily
refusing to embrace the test of its adoption to the case.
It might be argued that the test is immaterial to the case since the lot was improved, but the rather indefinite facts indicate that the propery was first improved in 1934, only twelve years before the barricading. Connecting this with
the doctrine that user originating with permission or the presumption of permission establishes the character of user which continues until the changed circumstances or acts of the patties affirmatively reject it, and thaf the period of prescriptive use first commences running from Such time of affirmative rejection, Richardson v. Horn, 282 Ky. 5, 137 S. W. (2d) 394 (1940); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Cornelius, 165 Ky. 132, 176 S. W. 964 (1915); Bowman v. Wickliffe, supra; 4
TnANy, REAL PiOPERTY § 1196a (3rd ed., Jones, 1939), it becomes obvious that
there is reason to apply the unimproved test, if it is applicable to urban property,
to determine whether the use before 1934 was permissive.
Is the test applicable to urban property? As stated above, originally the presumption of permission only arose from use of unenclosed or unimproved rural
land, especially woodland. Courts have been mysteriously reluctant in many jurisdictions to apply the same test to urban property. Shepard v. Gilbert, 212 Wis.
1, 249 N. W. 54 (1933). This may be traced in part to the seemingly imperishable vestiges of the old "do-not-break-my-close" Blackstonian attitude. But why
should any distinction be drawn between urban and rural property? Perchance it
is the romantic assumption that city property need be and can be more effectively
guarded. The very basis of that assumption, however, creates its antithesis: that
the close association of city life necessitates legally unfettered mutual accommodation.
just as the courts have predicated permissive use to unimproved rural land
upon the grounds that:
It would be unreasonable to deduce from the owner's quiet acquiescence, a simple act of neighborhood courtesy, in the use of a way convenient to others, and not injurious to himself, over land unimproved or
in woods, consequences so seriously detracting from the value of the land
thus used, and compel him needlessly to interpose and prevent the enjoyment of the privilege in order to the preservation of the right of property
unimpaired,
Boyden v. Achenbach, 86 N. C. 397, 399 (1882), former app., 79 N. C. 539 (1878),
they have apprehended the popular movement towards neighborliness in urban
communities as well, and have begun to apply the identical test to such property.
One of the first cases adopting the principle was Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 631,
66 Pac. 10, 11-12 (1901), where the court, in refusing to disturb a jury's finding of
permissive user, denounced in dictum the presumption of adverse use to unimproved
vacant city property, citing reasons of "kindness" and "neighborliness."
A prescriptive right was refused across a vacant portion of industrial property
in King v. Battle Creek Box Co., 235 Mich. 24, 209 N. W. 133 (1926), where the
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court held: "The use for a way of passage of uninclosed vacant land not in use
by the owner . . .is not in itself hostile to the owner. The presumption would
be ...subordination to the legal title."
The Ohio Appellate Court indicated that the making of a beaten path across
an unimproved vacant city lot, and from time to time spreading cinders and ashes
on the path, is not an infringement of the rights of the owner sufficient to give
notice of an adverse claim. Davidson v. Dunn, 16 Ohio App. 263 (1922). "The
use of vacant, uninclosed, and unoccupied land will be presumed to be by permission, and not adverse" Waller v. Hildebrecht, 295 Ill. 116, 128 N. E. 807 (1920).
Both of these cases are of controlling significance in the present case. The former
squarely controverts this court's implication that some upkeep of a roadway by
the user gels the presumption of adverse use. The latter exactly parallels the instant case; it involves a vacant portion of an improved lot.
An excellently written case with the court sitting en banc, Northwest Cities Gas
Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash. (2d) 75, 123 P. (2d) 771 (1942), aff'd, 17
Wash. (2d) 437, 135 P. (2d) 867 (1943), involving industrial property, held that
the general rule as to the presumption of adverseness if the use of way is unexplained:
... does

not apply however, to vacant, open, uninclosed, and unimproved
lands.. . Courts do not, in such cases, infer adverse user but require evidence of facts or circumstances that user was indeed adverse and not permissive.
Elsewhere the court states, "...
the question of adverse user is a question of fact."
This holding is unqualifiedly quoted and adopted in a case concerning vacant lots
in a suburban development. Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wash. (2d) 690, 175 P. (2d)
669 (1946).
An analysis of these typical cases evinces that the coktemporary tendency is
to apply the test of "unimproved" to urban as well as rural property. Anything
more than a cursory examination of the cases discloses that the courts are evolving
even a more flexible rule. It might be stated: permissive user of way will be presumed, in the absence of any affirmative conduct by the parties to the contrary, if
such user is indicative of neighborly accommodation (not permission) and involves no substantial interference with the owner's normal use. This rule, yet to
be explicitly stated although already applied, espouses the common sense rule that
use of a neighbor's land resulting from mere neighborly accommodation or courtesy is not adverse. Meike v. Schober, 12 Ohio Supp. 41 (1943).
The court here has subjected the landowner to the older and narrower view,
which admittedly has support in many jurisdictions. Their refusal to apply the
test of "unimproved," much less the broader rule stated above, to the defendant's
lot, has precluded the possibility of permissive use before 1934, which if accepted
would have prevented the running of the prescriptive period of twenty years.
Consequently, to her surprise, the landowner has given a right of way across her
lot; common sense has been confounded; the ends of neighborliness and charity
have been frustrated. These ramifications do not make this holding an impressive milestone in the annals of judicial progress.
Proceeding to the second point, the defendant contended that user was to be
deemed permissive, as the plaintiffs'-use was only as a part of the public. The
court held that the facts did not support this contention, but nevertheless in dictum
subscribed to the doctrine of Hall v. Backus, 92 W. Va. 155, 114 S. E. 449 (1922),
saying:
If a road, which was started in such a manner as to make the user
adverse and exclusive, is afterwards enjoyed in common with the public,
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the user does not lose its exclusive character as the result of the joinder
of the public therein.
This is declarative of the theory that the establishment of a road to one's
property (with no mention of necessity; the facts of this case imply convenience)
is a fact sufficient in itself to create a presumption of adverse exclusive user, even
though the public has joined in the use therein, with the burden of rebutting this
presumption resting on the property owner. Although the court later speaks of
the commencement of a way by an individual as a fact from which the jury may
find an exclusive use, the suggestion actually laid down is more than legal acceptability of a possible factual conclusion. The rule lies somewhere in that nebulous no-man's land between legal presumptions and factual conclusions. The case
being followed, Hall v. Backus, 92 W. Va. 155, 114 S. E. 449 (1922), is one of
the few, if not the only case that has gone that far. The overwhelming rule is that
the use of way by an individual in common with the public at least rebuts the
presumption of adverse exclusive use, Day v. Allender, 22 Ind. 511 (1864); Witt v.
Creasey, 117 Va. 872, 86 S. E. 128 (1915), if it does not establish a presumption
of permissive use itself. Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 344, 285 S. W. 567
(1926). Therefore it becomes a question of fact as to what constitutes exclusive
use, with the burden of proof resting squarely upon the one attempting to set up
the right in himself. District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 21 S. Ct.
283, 45 L. Ed. 440 (1901); Witt v. Creasey, supra; Blakemore v. Matthews, supra.
By reviewing other authorities, it appears that the court may have gone too far
by suggesting that the commencement of a road by an individual, even in a manner connoting adversity, creates a presumption of adverse use despite the fact that
the public subsequently joins in the use thereof. If we would normally presume
permission to the public, why should not permission be presumed to the concurrent use by a member of the public regardless of the chronological order of commencement? Even more compelling is the objection that the dictum does not
follow the spirit of reality in the modem view that permissive use will be presumed whenever possible, Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash.
(2d) 75, 123 P. (2d) 771 (1942), aff'd, 17 Wash. (2d) 437, 135 P. (2d) 867 (1943) ;
Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wash. (2d) 690, 175 P. (2d) 669 (1946), to prevent the
deprivation of one's property because he has been kind.
In the face of the obvious weight of authority, bolstered by common sense, one
is compelled to suggest that the rule should be that permissive user will be presumed when an individual is joined by the public in the use of a way, with the
burden falling upon the individual to rebut this presumption and affirmatively establish his claim of individual exclusive adverse use.
It must be re-emphasized that the facts as given in the opinion are not beyond
other interpretation; that the court may easily have been perfectly correct in its
holding and dictum on the actual facts; but that the inferences reasonably drawn
from the facts as stated promulgate rules that are a distinct handicap to the typical
landowner, discourage neighborliness and courteous accommodation, and pointedly
conflict with common sense and any unsophisticated ideal of natural justice and
Christian charity.
Mark Harry Berens

CoNsTnnIoxAL LAw-ELEcTIONS--DScRuINAiON AoGmsT AxPIwcTs FOR
Tnz FRAI CSCE ON nm BASIS oF RACE OR CoLoR.-Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp.
872 (S. D. Ala. 1949). This case marks the unsuccessful conclusion of another
attempt to deprive the American Negro of the right to vote. Specifically, it was
an attempt to avoid the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Smith v. Allwrigt, 321 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944), by passing
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an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Alabama. The realistic test
of what constitutes "state action" laid down in Smith v. Alwuright caused the advocates of "white supremacy" to find another way to bar the Negro from voting.
The "Boswell Amendment" was enacted as the best means of accomplishing this
purpose. The present decision is the answer of the courts to this evasive effort.
This suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama by ten Negro citizens of Mobile County, Alabama, against
the Board of Registrars of said county and the individual members thereof, to
declare and secure their rights to register as electors. The relief sought was a
declaratory judgment declaring the Boswell Amendment unconstitutional and an
injunction against the further enforcement of the provisions thereof. The Boswell
Amendment, as it is popularly captioned, was an amendment to § 181 of the Constitution of Alabama changing the requirements for registration of electors so that
only those persons who could "understand and explain" any article of the Constitution of the United States could be registered as electors.
The plaintiffs alleged that this amendment was purposely sponsored, its adoption obtained, and its provisions so administered as to prevent the plaintiffs and
others, solely because of their race, from exercising their right to vote. It was
further alleged that this amendment vests in the Board of Registrars unlimited
discretion to grant or deny the plaintiffs or others similarly situated the right
to register as electors; that the right to register is a prerequisite to voting in any
election, federal, state or local; that said amendment contains no definite, reasonable or recognizable standard or test to be applied in determining the qualifications of electors; that the defendants refused to register the plaintiffs while at the
same time the defendants were registering white applicants without requiring them
to explain any articles of the Constitution. The defendants denied these allegations
but admitted there was a controversy such as would satisfy the constitutional requirements in respect to declaratory judgments.
The charges of discrimination were substantiated in the evidence by factual

statistics garnered from the records kept by the defendant Registration Board which

showed that of the estimated 230,000 citizens of Mobile County, Alabama, (approximately sixty-four percent white and thirty-six percent colored) 2800 white

persons had been registered and approximately 104 Negroes.
In deciding upon the constitutionality of this amendment, the court readily

admitted that the states, and not the Federal Government, have the power to prescribe the qualifications of electors; that the courts intervene in such matters

only when there is a question of contravention of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth

Amendments. The issue thus narrowed itself to the question of whether the test
imposed by this amendment was contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. The courts have held that states may prescribe a literacy test for electors. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59
L. Ed. 1340 (1915). The states may not, however, deny due process or equal

protection of the laws in the exercise of the right of suffrage because of the prohibitions in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. S36, 47
S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927). The Fifteenth Amendment is more specific in
its protection in that it guarantees the free exercise of the right of franchise as

against state discrimination based upon race or color.

Guinn v. United States,

;upra; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281 (1939).
The court held that the Boswell Amendment did not meet the test of either
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments and was therefore unconstitutional. The
court found as a matter of fact that discrimination had been practiced. This
was obvious from the statistical record of rejections by the board. The next step
was an examination of the test of qualification for registration provided by the
Boswell Amendment. The key words in the Amendment were "understand and
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explain." After a critical examination of the meanings which might be ascribed
to such words, the court decided that they were ambiguous, uncertain and indefinite in meaning, and in effect conferred upon such registration boards an arbitrary power to accept or reject a prospective voter. As the court said:
The language does not call for a simple, fair or reasonable understanding or explanation. It does not say that the understanding and explanation must be partial, full, complete, definite, proper, fair, reasonable, plain,
precise, correct, accurate, or give any rule, guide or test as to the nature
of the understanding or explanation that is required... No uniform, objective or standardized test or examination is provided whereby an impartial board could determine whether the applicant has a reasonable understanding and can give a reasonable explanation of the articles of the
Constitution (if, indeed, the test were to be a reasonable understanding
and a reasonable explanation).

The court illustrated the gross impossibility of imposing such a test by citing
the fact that even the learned Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States

are split four different ways as to the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
applicability of the first eight Amendments of the Constitution to state action.
Viewed in this light, it.was evident to the court that the test imposed by the Boswell Amendment had given the board the arbitrary power to accept or reject
any prospective registrant. The court said: "Such arbitrary power amounts to a
denial of equal protection of the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, and is condemned by Yick Wo and many other
decisions of the Supreme Court." (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886)].
The court went on to state that the measure was unconstitutional, not only

in its purpose, but in its operation and administration as well. This was easily
deducible from the fact that many Negroes had been refused registration for inability to explain the constitutional articles when otherwise qualified. On the
other hand, not one white applicant was excluded for these reasons.
To the objection made by the defendants that the amendment was not racist
in origin and that it did not expressly refuse the right of registration to a Negro
because of race or color, the court replied with a quotation from the Lane case
rejecting a similar objection:
The Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-

minded modes of discrimination.. . It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored
race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to
race."
This statement apparently typifies the attitude of the present Supreme Court
toward subtle attempts by would-be oppressors of human rights to hide behind
the literal provisions of a measure which in fact operates to rob men of their
constitutional rights. This attitude seems to sound the "death knell" for those
who would rely on "strict formalism in the law" as an instrumentality to be
utilized in blocking realistic and humane decisions dictated by precepts of natural
justice.

The Supreme Court of the United'States affirmed this decision of the federal
district court without opinion, .... U. S..... , 69 S. Ct. 749 (1949). Mr. Justice
Reed was the only Justice who thought the appeal worthy of granting jurisdiction.
The reason given was that the case involved a constitutional provision of a state.
He in no way suggested that he would dissent on the merits of the case.

Our constitutional history subsequent to the passage of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments abounds with cases exposing the attempts to prevent Ne-
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groes from voting by measures which are not in literal contravention of the Constitution. Citation of a few leading cases will illustrate the nature and variety
of these attempts and give some idea of what may be expected in the future
moves of the advocates of "white supremacy."
For many years certain southern states utilized the so-called "grandfather
clauses" to bar the Negro vote. These clauses based the privilege of voting upon
qualifications of a period prior to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which the Negroes could not satisfy, of course, since they were descendants of
ancestors not qualified to vote prior to the passage of these amendments. These
clauses were declared unconstitutional in Guinn v. U. S., supra.
The next "escape valve" of major importance was the doctrine that primary
elections were not part of the electoral process and therefore not covered by provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment. A leading case supporting this view was
Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed. 913 (1921). It
was overruled by United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed.
1368 (1941).
In an attempt to bar the Negro from voting in the Texas primary elections,
a statute was enacted which expressly stipulated that no Negro was eligible to
vote in a Democratic primary in the State of Texas. This was held to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Nixon v. Herndon, supra. The Texas
legislature followed this decision by a statute which attempted to delegate to the
State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party the right to prescribe the
membership qualifications, and thereby bar the Negro from the vote, but this was
likewise declared an unconstitutional delegation of state power. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984 (1932). To meet this decision,
Negro membership in the Democratic Party of the state of Texas was prohibited
by a resolution of the state convention of the party. This prohibition was upheld
by Grovey v. Townsend, 294 U. S. 699, 55 S. Ct. 351, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935), on
the theory that this did not constitute state action since it was not based on any
state statute.
Smith v. Alluwight, supra, expressly overruled Grovey v. Townsend. In the
process of declaring the prohibition of the Democratic convention to be state action, the Supreme Court adopted a new standard of what constitutes state action.
The test formerly applied was based essentially upon the determination of whether
the state or the party paid the expenses of the primary election. The test applied
in the Smith case was, in effect, that if any kind of statutory recognition, however
slight, were given to the party primary system it was sufficient to render such
rules as to qualifications by the party state action. This test would apparently
make any action by a recognized political party, operating with reference to a
state statute under such a system, ineffective to exclude persons otherwise qualified to vote from participating in party primaries. It was this decision which the
Boswell Amendment unsuccessfully attempted to negate.
From this fragmentary citation of recent decisions on this question, it appears
that further attempts to bar the Negro vote by the instrumentality of discriminatory literacy tests will prove futile. They can now be classified as attempts to
harass the Negro voter by contributing to the general plan of intimidation.
Notwithstanding the encouraging trend of Supreme Court decisions, it appears
that the only true relief from the hydra-headed monster of racial discrimination
against the Negro voter will come by way of congressional legislation. It is a matter of speculation whether the present Court would follow the statement of Mr.
Justice Douglas in his dissent in the Classic case, wherein he expressed the belief
that Congress has the power to control primary elections.
Francis W. Collopy

RECENT DECISIONS
CoNsrrruroNAL LAw

PoLIcE PowzR - REGULATION BY PROmITORY Liv. Kruse, .... Mont ......... , 199 P. (2d) 971 (1948). A
Montana Statute, MONT. REv. CODES AN. § 2620.45 (1935), imposed license fees
of $250 per quarter on retail dealers in oleomargarine. In this case the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed a declaratory judgment of a district court which declared this section unconstitutional. The court held this. section to violate both
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and sections
3 and 27 of Article III of the Constitution of Montana, in that "it denies to
plaintiff and others similarly situated the right to carry on a lawful business without due process of law." The license fees collected on oleomargarine during the prior
ten years had exceeded the cost of supervision and regulation for an average of
853 per cent. Since the court held the challenged measure to be of a regulatory
rather than of a tax nature, such evidence warranted the court's finding that the
license provided by the statute was unreasonable, excessive, confiscatory, prohibitive, and unconstitutional, as a denial of due process and equal protection of the
laws, and as levying taxes for a private purpose.

cmsNS

Fz.--Brackmain

The plaintiff, an owner and operator of two retail grocery stores in Montana,
alleged that the fees exacted by the law were so excessive and unreasonable in
amount as to prohibit the plaintiff and more than ninety-two per cent of the
other grocery stores operating in Montana from selling oleomargarine, and thus
that the fees so required were such as to be prohibitive of a useful and general
occupation. The plaintiff based his claim on the fact that, while the questionable
section purported to have been enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the state, it in effect prohibited the carrying on of a legitimate, profitable industry and the sale of a healthful, nutritious food and that such prohibition was unnecessary for protection of public health, morals, safety, or welfare, and as a result is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and of sections 3 and 27 of Article III and sections
I and II of Article XII of the Montana Constitution.
The defendants were the Commissioner of Agriculture and the Dairy Commissioner of the State of Montana, both of whom are administrative officers
authorized by law to administer and enforce the challenged section. In support of
the defendants were various dairymen and buttermakers who were allowed to intervene as producers, buyers, and consumers of butter and other dairy products
within the State of Montana.
The case resolved itself into an issue of whether the measure exacting the
fees was regulatory or a simple revenue measure. The plaintiff alleged and the
intervenors admitted that it was a regulatory measure; but the Attorney General and the defendants- were quick to sense the danger in attempting to sustain
the Act as a regulatory measure and therefore denied that it was enacted under
the police power of the state and contended that it was nothing more than a
simple revenue measure.
The statute involved in this case was originally enacted as part of a comprehensive measure regulating the dairy industry. To decide whether it was regulatory or fiscal in nature, the court examined the nature of the original Act. It was
entitled:
An Act to regulate the Dairy Industry in the State of Montana ...
Designating the Powers and Duties of the Department of Agriculture,
Labor and Industry in Relation to the Dairy Industry and the Enterprises
Regulated by this Act; . . . Regulating the Handling and Sale of Oleomargarine and Other Substitutes for Dairy Products and Licensing of Persons Dealing Therein ....
The court said that a mere reading and examination of the Act clearly disclosed its regulatory nature.
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This same court in State ex rel. State Aeronautics Commission et at. v. Board
of Examiners of State et al. ....... Mont ......... , 194 P. (2d) 633 (1948), fully considered and discussed the distinction between a revenue measure enacted under the
police power and one made under the power to tax, holding that while the former
has a regulatory purpose, the latter is only intended to produce revenue. In line
with this distinction see 4 CooLrz, TAXATioN § 1809 (4th ed. 1924), wherein it
is stated:
A fee for a license . . . must be such a fee only as will legitimately
assist in the regulation; and it should not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license and inspecting and regulating the business which it covers.
Having made the decision that the measure was a regulatory one rather than
one for revenue, the court found ample precedent for declaring the measure unconstitutional on the ground that it was unreasonable, excessive, confiscatory, and
prohibitive. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Flynn et al v. Horst et al.,
356 Pa. 20, 51 A. (2d) 54 (1947), held a state license fee of $500 on wholesalers
and $100 on retailers of oleomargarine violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Pennsylvania fee was so excessive that the amount collected was two to five
times the amount expended, and was therefore an oppressive and unwarranted
restriction on a lawful business. The Pennsylvania Court held that the exaction was
a fee rather than a tax, and since the income was grossly disproportionate to the
cost of regulating the business, it was unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive.
As Cooley, 2 CooLsa, CoNST. LmnTATIoNs 1228 (8th ed., Carrington 1927), has
stated:
The exercise of power for the public welfare may inconvenience individuals, increase their labor, and decrease the value of their property.
It is a matter resting in the discretion of the legislature, and the courts
will not interfere therewith except where the regulations adopted are arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable.
In declaring the questionable statute unconstitutional in the instant case the
Montana Supreme Court saidl
The dairy commissioner's records disclosed that the license fees collected on oleomargarine during the past ten years exceeded the cost of
supervision and regulation for an average of 853 per centum. Such evidence fully warrants the trial court's finding that the license provided
for by section 2620.45, R. C. M. 1935, is excessive, confiscatory and prohibitive.
The decision in this case can best be understood by reviewing the history of
the many burdensome restrictions imposed on the sale of oleomargarine both by
Congress and many state legislatures. In 1886, the first federal tax was passed
which imposed a two cent per pound excise tax on all margarine, and also
imposed license taxes on all manufacturers and sellers of the product, 24 STAT.
209 (1886). This law was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in its
first decision relating to oleomargarine, Ex parte Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct.
444, 41 L. Ed. 813 (1897). This law, however, did not serve to restrict the sales
of colored oleomargarine, and thus most of the states passed laws prohibiting
the sale of all oleomargarine or prohibited the sale of the colored product. In
1902, Congress passed the Graut Bill which levied a tax of ten cents per pound
on colored oleomargarine and one-fourth cent per pound on uncolored oleomargarine. This Act exists in its amended form today. 24 STAT. 209 (1886), as amended,
26 U. S. C. § 2301 (1946). In McGray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24
S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904), the United States Supreme Court sanctioned
this split tax and took the position that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the imposition of a tax which would destroy a legitimate business. The
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Court conceded that the tax would prohibit colored margarine, but refused
to look into the motives of Congress in passing the law, and, since it was a revenue
measure on its face, held it a valid exercise of the taxing power. This case is
now considered the law on the subject, and has been cited in Cliff v. United
States, 195 U. S. 159, 25 S. Ct. 1, 49 L. Ed. 139 (1904), and again with approval
in Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed. 1s
(1944).
In the early days of the states' absolute prohibiton of the sale of oleomargarine, the courts were inclined to uphold the measures as an exercise of the valid police power of the state. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 S. Ct. 992,
32 L. Ed. 253- (1888); Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 15 S. Ct. 154,
39 L. Ed. 223 (1894); and Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 22 S. Ct.
120, 46 L. Ed. 171 (1902), are examples of this early attitude of the courts. In
1898 the rule of the Powell case came into conflict with the Interstate Commerce
Clause and in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 S. Ct. 757, 43 L. Ed.
49 (1898), the rule was restricted to intrastate transactions, the Court holding
that the same Pennsylvania statute upheld in the earlier cases could not be applied to a sale by an importer or his agent in the original package. From 1898
to 1927, when Jelke Co. v. Emery, 193 Wis. 311, 214 N. W. 369 (1927), was
decided, there were many conflicting decisions on the question of state power to.
restrict absolutely the sale of oleomargarine, but by 1927 most of the statutes
having that effect had been repealed and Jelke v. Emery, supra, by striking down
the last one, put an end to them entirely.
The old and absolute outright method of prohibition gave way to the modem
method of regulation and prohibition by taxation. In Magnano Co. v.Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934), the Supreme Court held
that the difference between butter and margarine was sufficient to warrant a separate classification for tax purposes, and that a tax, being a revenue measure, did
not violate the Due Process Clause even though it would result in the destruction of the business. In accord with this holding are Hammond Packing Co. v.
Montana, 233 U. S.331, 34 S. Ct. 596, 58 L. Ed. 985 (1914), and Schmitt v. Nord,
........
S. D ........
, 27 N. W. (2d) 910 (1947), app. dis., 334 U. S. 809, 68 S.Ct.
1018, 92 L. Ed. 984 (1948), refusing to look behind the revenue designation of
the law to expose its regulatory character. In Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189
S. E. 26 (1936), a tax was upheld which taxed all margarine except that made
from certain enumerated oils. Contra: Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N. W.
(2d) 664 (1945), which held that such a classification was unreasonable since the
vegetable oils were equal in every way to the tax exempt animal fat.
In the light of this short historical summary, it is plain why in this instant
case the Montana court first found it necessary to hold that the questionable
measure was regulatory, and not merely fiscal in nature. In the light of the
above enumerated past decisions, the court had sufficient judicial authority to
hold the measure unconstitutional when it found that it was an unreasonable
exercise of the state's regulatory power; however, had they held that it was a
revenue measure, they would have run into considerable opposition and had little
supporting judicial authority in declaring the measure unconstitutional. The Magnano rule has never been overruled and is still the law in most jurisdictions.
A definite trend of judicial opinion has been manifested by the many court
decisions handed down. As has been seen, the courts have altered considerably
their views toward oleomargarine since the early days when it was held in the
Powell case that absolute prohibition was legal. Now they are refusing to remain blind to the real purpose of fiscal and regulatory legislation, as in Flynn v.
Horst, supra, and in the instant case. In the early decisions the courts talked
about the need of regulating the new margarine industry for the benefit of the
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consumers. Now they are speaking about the protection of the oleomargarine
producers' rights to engage in a free competitive business. There is also much evidence that there is an ever-increasing reaction against the dairymen's lobby;
against their concerted effort to keep a cheap and much needed article off the
market. As the principal case illustrated, the legislation their actions inspire is
becoming increasingly difficult to disguise as regulation in the public interest.
About the only thing upon which they can rely is the Supreme Court's ruling
that it is not against due process to burden unfairly a business with revenue taxes to such an extent that it is prohibitive and even destructive of the business.
If anything will make the courts alter their stand on this matter it will be the
growing popular demand for oleomargarine and the growing reaction against the
unfairness of discriminatory legislation to both the producers and potential consumers of oleomargarine.
Patrick F. Coughlin

UNITED STATES -

SocILt

SEcuRITY

ACT

-

RErA.ioNsHIP OF EmepLOYER AZw

Eiay'ox.-Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 7th 1949).

The court in the instant case seems to have given the recent amendment to the
Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 647 (1935), as amended, 62 STAT. 438, U. S. C. A.
§1301 (a) (6) (Supp. 1948), limiting the definition of the term "employee" to
its common law signification, its intended effect in holding that taxi drivers who
rented their taxis from the plaintiff, but were subject to partial control, were independent contractors, and thus not within the coverage of the Act. The amend-

ment provides:
The term "employee" includes an officer of a corporation, but such
term does not include (1) any individual who, under the usual common-

law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship,
has the status of an independent contractor, or (2) any individual (ex-

cept an officer of a corporation) who is not an employee under such common-law rules.
This is the most concrete statement of a definition of the term "employee" for
the purposes of the Act that has yet been attempted. Prior to this amendment,
there was no definition of the relationship of employer and employee except that
provided by Amended U. S. Treas. Reg. 90 (1939), 26 CoDE Fsn. RaMs. § 403.204
(Supp. 1940). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 91 (1936), 26 CODE Fan. Rm.s. § 401.3
(1938).
The plaintiff, an Illinois corporation organized "to operate taxicabs and automobiles for hire as a public and private carrier of freight and passengers," sued to
recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected under the provisions of Titles VIII and IX of the Act. 49 STAT. 636, 639 (1935), as amended,
53 STAT. 1 (1939), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1001 ot seq., 1101 et seq. (1946). See INT. REV.
Cona, §§ 1400, 1410, 1520. Plaintiff owned the taxicabs and had procured all
city and state licenses as well as personal injury insurance required by the state
for their operation. He was listed in the classified telephone directory as offering taxicabs for hire; and he maintained an office equipped with switchboard
operators to take in-coming calls for taxi service, which calls the drivers were
not required to accept. Plaintiff also maintained a garage with mechanics for the
repair and maintenance of his 'equipment and took care of all other expenses,
except that drivers bought their own gas and oil for operating the cabs. The
drivers' principal livelihood was derived from this occupation; they paid the
plaintiff a set amount for use of the cabs and were not required to report their
earnings, nor was their area of operation under control of the plaintiff. They
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operated plaintiff's cabs in shifts determined and fixed by the plaintiff under an
oral agreement effective from day to day. In the course of operations, the plaintiff had occasionally called a. meeting to instruct the drivers in safety measures,
and had forbidden drinking while on duty.
The main issue presented for decision was whether the drivers of plaintiff's
taxicabs were, under the terms of the Act, its employees, whose earnings were
wages so as to make the plaintiff liable for the tax sought to be recovered. The
court, in reversing the lower court's decision and granting judgment for the
plaintiff, in the light of the amendment to the Social Security Act, applied the
strict common-law test for determining the existence of the employer-employee
relationship. They held that the relationship exists when an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done,
that is, the result, but also as to how it shall be done, that is, the means by
which that result is accomplished. They added that:
While the plaintiff no doubt was interested in the operation to the
extent that it was in the interest of its business that the public be
satisfactorily served, we are unable to discern how it had any considerable authority over the accomplishment of such a result.
In arriving at this decision, the court relied principally upon the congressional
purpose in amending the Act. They said that its importance lay in the fact that
other courts had been widening the scope of the term "employee" beyond the
concept of the definition as laid down in this amendment; consequently, "such
cases and the rationale thereof carry little, if any, weight at the present time."
However there is a split of authority respecting the problem presented for decision. Many courts have decided that the strict common-law control test should
be applied in determining the relationship. See, e.g., United States v. Aberdeen
Aerie, 148 F. (2d) 655 (C.C.A. 9th 1945); McGowan v. Lazeroff, 148 F. (2d)
512 (C.C.A. 2nd 1945); Glenn v. Standard Wl Co., 148 F. (2d) 51 (C.C.A. 6th
1945); Tidwell v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1945); Cannon
Valley Milling-Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 785 (Minn. 1945) ; American Oil
Co. v. Fly, 135 F. (2d) 491 (C.CA. 5th 1943); Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F.
(2d) 636 (C.CA. 2nd 1941); Radio City Music Hall Corporationv. United States,
135 F. (2d) 715 (C.C.A. 2nd 1943); United States v. Mutual Trucking Co, 141 F.
(2d) 655 (C.C.A. 6th 1944).
Numerous other courts have either given a liberal interpretation to the common-law "control test" or have disregarded it altogether. See e.g., Fahs v. TreeGold Co-Op., Inc., 166 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 5th 1948); Schwing et al. v. United
States, .165 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 3rd 1948); Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. S. C. 1948); Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.
(2d) 615 (C.C.A. loth 1947); Bartels et al. v. Birmingham et al., 332 U. S. 126,
67 S. Ct. 1547, 91 L. Ed. 1947 (1947); Rutherford Food Corporationet al. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722, 67 S. Ct. 1473, 91 L. Ed. 1772 (1947); United States v.
Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 67 S. Ct. 1463, 91 L. Ed. 1757 (1947); United States v.
Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F. (2d) 745 (C.C.A. 10th 1946); United States v. Vogue,
Inc., 145 F. (2d) 609 (C.C.A. 4th 1944); National Labor Relations Board v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944).
These courts have decided whether or not the employer-employee.relationship
existed by giving weight to the congressional purpose or intent in bringing the
Act into effect. The court in the principal case, while positively admitting there
is room for argument on both sides of the problem, nevertheless was conclusively
convinced that Congress, by the language it employed in amending the Act, did
not exclude from coverage merely those who are designated as independent contractors; but that it excluded, also, and without describing them, others not employees under the common-law rules.
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The lower court, in finding for the defendant, relied rather heavily on the
rationale of the Supreme Court in United States v. Silk, supra. The workmen
there were unloaders of coal. They provided their own tools, worked only when
they wished, and were paid an agreed price per ton to unload the coal. The
Supreme Court held that they were employees and that the employer was taxable under the Act. They rejected the common-law "right to control" test as the
sole determining factor, and gave weight to the congressional purpose and intent of the Act as other courts have done. (See cases cited in preceding paragraph.)
Although the "right to control" was considered the most important factor at
common-law, the determination today generally depends upon a consideration of
a number of important factors. The REsTATE
T, AGENCY, § 220 (1933), lists
nine such factors. Also, in respect to tort liability, there are listed, TrrAwy
obt AoF.Ncy, § 37 (2d ed. 1924), several important factors. The term "employee"
as used in the Act should have a more extensive application than the "control
test." In the dissenting opinion in Earle Restaurant v. O'Meara, 160 F. (2d) 275
(App. D.C. 1947), Associate Justice Clark maintained that to establish the relationship the actual conduct of the parties rather than the right to control should
be the determinative factor. In Schudng v. United States, supra, the court afirmed what was said in the Silk case, and held that in determining whether the
relationship exists under the Act, degree of control, opportunities for profit or
loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the
claimed independent operation are important matters to consider. Furthermore,
the court maintained that no one factor is controlling, nor are those mentioned
exclusive. It appears from the foregoing statements that the application of the
term "employee" should not be constricted, but that it should be construed so as
better to accomplish the purpose which the Act was intended to serve. As Mr.
Justice Reed in the Silk case points out, a constricted interpretation:
. . .would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the
difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit
schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate
burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation.
These considerations have guided the courts' construction of the Act. See e.g.,
Social Security Board v. Nierotho, 149 F. (2d) 273 (C.C.A. 6th 1945), aff'd,
327 U. S. 358, 66 S. Ct. 637, 90 L. Ed. 718 (1946); Buckstaff Bath House Co.
v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358, 60 S. Ct. 279, 84 L. Ed. 322 (1939). Also, see General Wayne Inn, Inc., v. Rothensies, 47 F. Supp. 391 (E. D. Pa. 1942), where
the court held that the "power to hire and fire" is the most significant factor
in determining upon whom, as "employer," the economic burden of the social
security program is placed.
The court in the principal case did not attribute much weight to the fact that
the lower court found that the plaintiff did exercise "a reasonable amount of
control over the methods and means by which the drivers performed their services." They dismissed the fact by stating that "a reasonable amount of control"
is too relative a term, and that as a factual statement it is too uncertain and indefinite. Yet it is found that "a reasonable amount of control" is determinative
and substantial enough to show that an employer-employee relationship exists
in many cases. See e.g,, Hearst Publications, Inc. v. United States, 70 F. Supp.
666 (N. D. Calif. 1946); United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., supra; United
States v. Vogue, Inc., supra; Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176 (C.C.A. 10th
1941).
The sole dissenting opinion of the principal case, by Judge Swygert, was very
much in harmony -with the idea of "a reasonable amount of control" as substantially enough ground upon -which to determine that the relationship exists.
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While agreeing that the plaintiff's liability must be measured by applying the
common-law rule, he said, nevertheless, inter alia, that "the circumstances which
indicate that these taxicab drivers are employees outweigh those which may
indicate otherwise." It was his impression that those circumstances were sufficient
to meet the test of the common-law rule, thus being very much in accord with
the doctrine that "a reasonable amount of control" is determinative and substantial enough to indicate that the relationship exists.
In view of the opposing results which have often been reached and the
divergence of opinion reflecting the views of various judges, the dissent of
Judge Swygert appears to represent the most desirable interpretation. From the
social and economic aspect, it appears better -that wherever persons are subjected
to the existing evils which the legislation of the Act was intended to defeat, they
should be covered in the interpretation given to the Act, regardless of whether
they are deemed employees in the strict common-law sense or not. It is the responsibility of Government to guarantee a minimum standard of security to its
people, to bear the responsibility of assuring that every individual will at least
have the minimum necessities to maintain his life in sound health and moral
decency. It was in the grave interest of the national health and welfare that the
institution of the Social Security Act had taken form. The gravity of that problem of insecurity with which the country was once faced should not be forgotten
simply because of our present relative prosperity.
Benedict R. Danko

CoNxRAcTS ExTENSioN OF THE SCOPE OF DEcacRATOry JuDcmmE~s.-Beit
et al. v. Beit, ....Conn., 63 A. (2d) 161 (1948). This was an action by plaintiffs
for a declaratory judgment to determine whether a restrictive covenant limiting
the right to engage in business is legal and enforceable. From a judgment declaring the covenant invalid and unenforceable, the defendant appealed. The decision was affirmed.

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were in partnership with the husband's two
brothers and their wives. The partnership operated three stores which were engaged in the sale of groceries. The plaintiffs sold their interests in the business,
and to carry out the transaction, each of the plaintiffs executed two bills of .sale.
All of the instruments contained the following clause: "I further expressly covenant and agree with this vendee, his heirs and assigns, not to engage in the meat
market or grocery business within the limits of New London County, Connecticut, for a period of thirty years, from this day." The plaintiff sought to engage
in the retail grocery and meat business in New London County and brought this
action requesting a judgment declaring the covenants illegal.
The trial court's declaring the conitract illegal as in restraint of trade was not
the basic issue. The question was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain
an action which sought a declaratory judgment as to the legality of these covenants. The court said:
It is sometimes stated generally that the courts will not grant affirmative relief to the promisor in such a covenant by way of rescission or the
like . . . Where, however, the invalidity of the agreement is based on
the fact that it is against public policy, we have found only one decision
which directly denies such relief to a promisor, and in that case it was
pointed out that no public interest were involved. National Harrow Co.
v. Hench et al.,
76 F. 667, 670... On the other hand, it has been held
that in a proper case equity will grant relief of that nature to the prom-
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isor on the ground that the agreement is against public policy. Duval
v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 160; 26 N. E. 343 ...
Cf. Merchants' Line v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 222 N. Y. 344, 118 N. E. 788
(1918). The Duval case had been appealed from the Common Pleas Court of
New York where it had been held for the defendant, 1 N. Y. S. 70 (1888).
The minority opinion states that the majority cites no authority setting forth
logical and convincing reasons for granting affirmative relief by declaratory
judgment under the present circumstances, but bases its reasoning for permitting
a promisor to prove the invalidity of the agreement on Lord Mansfield's opinion
in Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775), where he
said:
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say.
See Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn. 124, 128, 44 Am. Rep. 210 (1881).
The dissenting judge felt that the principle, enunciated by Lord Mansfield in
the words just quoted, is clear from the further language which follows:
So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then
have the advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, potior
est conditio defendentis. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The dissent also states that this limitation upon the principle has been recognized repeatedly by the Connecticut court, namely: "The law could not take any
other position than that it will not lend its aid to either of the parties to an unmoral or illegal transaction."
In Cox v. Donnelly, 34 Ark. 762 (1879), cited by the majority opinion, the
court said:
Although, in general, courts of equity will not interpose to grant relief to persons who are parties to agreements or other transactions against
public policy, there are cases where the public interest requires that
they should, for the promotion of public policy, interpose, and the relief
in such cases is given to the public through the party. . . [citing] Hatch
v. Hatch, 9 Vesey 292; Lord St. John v. Lady St. John, 11 Vesey 526;
Jackman v. Mitchell, 13 Vesey 501; Law v. Law, 3 P. Williams 391.
In Schaefer v. National Bank oj Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 511, 18 N. E. (2d)
263 (1938), the Ohio court paid tribute to the value of the declaratory judgment in enabling a debtor to obtain release from an unconscionable or illegal
debt. Another case in point is Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth et al, 300 U. S.
227, 244, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937), which points out: "But the
character of the controversy and of the issue to be determined is essentially the
same whether it is presented by the insured [for a declaration of liability] or
by the insurer [for a declaration of non-liability]."
The minority view that it is manifest that the conclusion of the majority was
based upon the effect of the restriction on the plaintiffs themselves, as distinguished from any effect it might have upon the public, was answered quite emphatically:
Where a promisor in such an agreement seeks to have equitable relief based upon its illegality, the situation is very different from that
presented where the promisee seeks to enforce it; for the promisor is not
seeking to put it into effect but rather is asserting and furthering the
public policy of the state.

RECENT DECISIONS
The majority also points out that the Supreme Court of Illinois has said:
The answer to ihis is that in a situation of this kind the interest of
the public, rather than the equitable standing of individual parties, is of
determining importance. -The defense is not here allowed because the
party raising it is entitled to any consideration, but upon principles of
public policy and to conserve the public welfare. Parish v. Schwartz,
344 Ill. 563, 572, 176 N. E. 757 (1931).
It is well to remember that although the parties are in pari delUcto, yet the
courts may interfere and grant relief at the suit of one of them even though
the result may be that a benefit will be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal
guilt with the defendant. Gilchrist v. Hatch, 183 Ind. 371, 106 N. E. 694 (1914);
White v. Crew, 16 Ga. 416 (1854); James v. Steere, 16 R. I. 367, 16 AUt. 143

(1888).
The minority states:
A decision which establishes the right of- a person, who today has
executed such a restrictive contract as here for a substantial consideration paid, to procure tomorrow a decree of court which effectively deAermines that no liability rests upon him under this contract and that he
can keep the consideration he has received may well constitute a potent
temptation to fraud and place a premium upon dishonesty.
However, the facts of this case disclose that the clause contained in all the
instruments which prevented the plaintiffs from engaging in the meat business,
had not been discussed by either of the parties previous to the sale; nor had any
mention of inclusion been made. The attorney who drafted the bills inserted the
clause thinking that it would meet with the desire of the parties to do so, and
basing the provision on what he believed would be fair and reasonable; nor was
the clause discussed when the instruments were executed. These facts can only
be interpreted in one manner; not as labeled by the dissent "substantial consideration paid," but as a gratitous ratification for which no consideration passed.
In this type of case, plaintiffs have found, in the declaration of the invalidity of their contracts, a handy and effective source of removing potential
infringements and obtaining a release from obligations. Their motives may vary.
At times the purpose is frankly to rid themselves of illegal instruments which are
held over the plaintiffs as encumbrances or pseudo-obligations. Whatever the
purposes or motivating principles, we need not fear a strong temptation towards
fraud, nor be guilty of placing a premium upon dishonesty because we are
judicially ready to extend the scope of the declaratory judgment to enable
meritorious plaintiffs to benefit by it. If.public policy is only to be served by
allowing a plaintiff to seek a declaratory judgment, why hesitate and withhold
such a remedy merely because the plaintiff is also to benefit? This case illustrates
the necessity for the extension of the scope of the declaratory judgment.
Joseph M. Gaydos

CONSTTrUTIoAL LAW - LICNS3NG - EXTENT oF THE PoLicE PowER.-State
vi. Ballance, ....N. C. , 51 S. E. (2d) 731 (1949). Under the guise of the police
power, a state cannot validly enact a statute which prevents any person from participating in a lawful occupation, innocuous in itself, unless the protection of the
public health, morals, safety, or general welfare renders it necessary.
In this criminal action, Owen Ballance was convicted of engaging in the occupation of photography for compensation while not licensed. In a special verdict, the jury found that Ballance, by taking and producing photographs at a
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unit price in excess of ten cents per picture in a city whose population exceeded
twenty-five hundred people, violated a state statute. Under this special verdict
the court found the defendant guilty and fined him accordingly. Upon appeal,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared the law unconstitutional.
The statute applicable in this case provided for a State Board of Photographers composed of persons who had at least five years experience in professional
photography and who were appointed by the governor. Any person desiring to
practice commercial photography had to pass an examination administered by
this board and qualify as to competency, ability, and integrity to become eligible
for a license. The statute read as follows:
Prior to any applicant being admitted to an examination or license,
said board shall have the power to require proof as to the technical
qualifications, business record and moral character of such applicant,
and if an applicant shall fail to satisfy the board in any or all of these
respects, the board may decline to admit said applicant to examination
or to issue license.
The statute expressly prohibited any unlicensed person in North Carolina, with
certain class exemptions, from engaging in commercial photography, if he practiced his profession in a city whose population exceeded twenty-five hundred, or
if he charged more than ten cents per unit. The licenses obtained could be revoked because of failure to pay the annual license fee, for fraud or unethical
practices, for willful misrepresentations, or for being convicted of any crine in
North Carolina involving moral turpitude.
The defendant maintained that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution; since a person's business or occupation is
"property" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause and is included in the
right to liberty, the defendant rightly could maintain that he was deprived of
his property and his liberty by being prohibited from engaging in his chosen
occupation.
In order to declare this statute unconstitutional, the court had to overrule the
previous law of the state as enunciated in State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197
S. E. 586 (1938), which had held this statute to be constitutional. That case
held that it was necessary to invoke the police power of the state since: (1) photographers use combustible materials and there is a fire hazard, (2) photographs
are used in evidence, (3) photographs are used in detecting forgeries and altered
instruments, (4) photographs can lead to fraud through their use in advertising,
(5) photography is used in newspapers and periodicals.
Certainly none of these reasons tenders a cogent argument in favor of the
constitutionality of this statute, especially when the very able dissent of Judge
Barnhill in State v. Laurence is viewed. His dissent posed the question: "Does
the General Assembly have the power to create an administrative agency with
power to deprive a citizen of the right to practice one of the ordinary and uual
trades such as commercial photography?"
Regulation of businesses cannot be valid where it is an arbitrary interference
with the rights of the individual to engage in any lawful occupation. The regulation is dependent upon a reasonable necessity for its exercise to protect the health,
safety, morals, or general welfare of the state, and unless an act restricting the
ordinary occupations of life can be shown to fall within these objects of the
police power, the act is void. Doe v. Jones, 327 IN. 387, 158 N. E. 703 (1927).
The dissenting opinion in State v. Lawrence further points out that:
The regulations of business and professions through administrative
licensing has heretofore been limited to those professions having a direct
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and positive relation to the health, safety, or morals of the community.
The trade of photography bears no genuine resemblance to any of these
professions.
The statute in the instant case was declared also to be in violation of the
state constitution, which states:
That we hold it to be self-evident that all men are created with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment
of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness... No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties,
or privileges or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his
life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land... Perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not be
allowed.
The "liberty" which may not be unlawfully interfered with means not only
freedom from imprisonment or restraint, but also the right to live and work and
earn a livelihood in any lawful calling, or to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.
Saidel v. Village of Tupper Lake, 254 App. Div. 22, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 814, 818
(1938).
In view of the above excerpts from the North Carolina constitution and the
interpretation generally applied to the word "liberty," it would seem that the
court was justified.in declaring the statute in the instant case unconstitutional
as an unwarranted use of the police power.
Broad as is the police power, its limit is exceeded when the state
undertakes to require moral qualifications of one who wishes to engage
or continue in a business which, as usually conducted, is no more dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of life. [Rawles
v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 279 S. W. 350, 352 (1926)].
The dissent in the instant case maintains that the enactment of the statute is
within the police power of the state since that power is not limited to the
preservation of good order or the public safety and health, but includes the prevention of fraud and deceit which are incidents of the business.
The decision in the instant case is in conformity with other jurisdictions that
have ruled upon such statutes. In State v. Cromwell, 72 N. D. 565, 9 N. W. (2d)
914 (1943), a similar statute requiring licensing of photographers was defended
on the ground that the relation between photographer and customer was so intimate as to require the invoking of the police power of the state to control the
selection of photographers. The court held that the police power is not restricted
to matters concerned with the public health, morals and peace, but that it can
be invoked whenever public welfare demands it. However, the police power can
only regulate such businesses, not exclude persons therefrom. In declaring the
unconstitutionality of the regulatory measure, the court remarked that the purpose of the regulation must be to protect public health, morals or general welfare
and it must be reasonably adapted to that end.
Also in support of the instant case is Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S. E.
(2d) 647 (1939), which declared unconstitutional and void a photographers'
licensing act "as an exercise of the police power, in that the prescribed regulations
are imposed upon a lawful business, and considered as a whole are such as do
not bear any reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety or
morality, or other phase of the general welfare."
Other supporting cases are: Sullivan v. De Cerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. (2d)
571 (1945); Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S. E. (2d) 348 (1946); also see
Wright v. Wiles, 173 Tenn. 334, 117 S. W. (2d) 736 (1938).
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The principal case was decided on very firm ground since the purpose of the
statute obviously was to serve the special interest of a few who were engaged in
a particular occupation. It is indeed paradoxical that these few persons would
attempt to promote their own interests in a monopoly of a given occupation by
invoking the police power of the state which is intended to serve the public welfare. This type of class legislation is aimed at destroying the kind of individual
initiative which has made progress possible in such fields as photography.
The reasoning applied in the instant case is of the utmost force since, even
in State v. Lawrence, the only case holding that the licensing of photographers
was constitutional, the majority granted that while the General Assembly had
authority to say what professions and occupations were within the police power
of the state, it always had to have due regard for the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the North Carolina Constitution affirming the unalienability of the rights of life, liberty, and property
and prohibiting the creation of monopolies. In Liggett v. Balridge, 278 U. S.
105, 111-12, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. Ed. 204 (1928), Mr. Justice Sutherland used
similar reasoning, saying:
The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation
where otherwise the effect may be to invade rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, only when such legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase
of the general welfare. . . A state cannot, under the guise of protecting
the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful
occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon
them.
As already pointed out, this decision in the instant case brings North Carolina
into line with the other states which have declared statutes unconstitutional which
make it possible for a state administrative body to prohibit a person from practicing commercial photography because of his incompetency, lack of ability or
lack of integrity, as determined by the administrative body.
Undoubtedly the state can invoke the police power, through the legislature,
to enact laws to protect or promote the health, safety, morals, order or general
welfare within constitutional limits. State v. Lockey, 198 N. C. 551, 152 S. E.
693 (1930); Town of Clinton v. Ross, 226 N. C. 682, 40 S. E. (2d) 593 (1946).
The questions that arise immediately are: When does the health, safety, morals,
order or general welfare empower the state to use this power, and what are the
constitutional limitations on this power?
These questions cannot be answered in the abstract, but only as to concrete
problems. In the practice of photography it is held that the constitutional limitations prevent the state from invoking the police power. The status of any other
occupation is, as here, dependent on the necessity of its regulation to protect the
public health, order, morals, safety or general welfare.
William T. Huston

WILLS CONsTRUCTION - REFASONABLE Tnm AS A FACTOR IN RENUNCATION
oF LEoAcix.-In re Wilson's Estate, .... N. Y....., 83 N. E. (2d) 852 (1949). Kate
Wilson, decedent, made a will wherein she bequeathed to her son, Leslie B. Wilson, a legacy consisting of a one-third interest in her residuary estate. The value
of this interest amounted to about twelve thousand dollars.
At the request of a judgment creditor, the surrogate court enjoined Leslie's
brother and sister, as executors under the will, from transferring any of the
legacy to the debtor, Leslie B. Wilson. The court also enjoined this debtor from
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in any way disposing of his interest in the legacy. In a few days the court appointed a receiver to take title to the debtor's legacy. Within a week the debtor
filed a renunciation of this legacy. Leslie's mother had been deceased for about
ten months before the filing of this renunciation.
The supreme court upheld the surrogate court's ruling that the renunciation
was valid, thus defeating the judgment creditor, and allowing his brother and
sister, as remaining residuary legatees (also executors), to take Leslie's one-third
share. The receiver appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York seeking advice
and instructions as to the true construction of the will in view of the alleged
renunciation. This court reversed the lower court rulings and directed the executors to pay over the one-third share of Leslie's interest to the receiver to be
applied in satisfaction of the judgment creditor's claim against him. In so ordering, the court held that a renunciation of a beneficial legacy must be made within
a reasonable time; that this time would be shorter when the effect thereof would
be to prevent satisfaction of a judgment against the legatee. The court said that
the legacy had also been accepted by the word and conduct of the debtor preceding his filed renunciation. Further, under the statute, N. Y. Cvm PRAcTrxcE
AcT, § 916, as construed by this court, the legatee had such an interest in the
legacy that he could be (and was) enjoined from disposing of it in any way, including renunciation. This interest that Leslie had from the moment of his
mother's death was defined as a chose in action.
Justice Fuld, in writing the dissent, concurred in by Chief Justice Loughran,
claimed that the debtor had not by word or act accepted the legacy, had no interest capable of being enjoined, had not waited an unreasonable length of time
under the circumstances, and had in fact made a timely and absolute renunciation of the gift.
The majority construed the statute to mean that the debtor had a chose in
action between the time his mother died until he had by an affirmative act renounced the gift. Once enjoined, Leslie could not part with this chose in action,
and hence it resulted in his having accepted the legacy as a matter of law.
The weight of authority holds that a legacy is an offer passing no title. In
re Wells' Estate, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N. W. 713 (1909); Albany Hosp. v. Albany
Guardian Society and Home for Friendless,214 N. Y. 435, 108 N. E. 812 (1915);
Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20 (1922); People v. Flanagin,
331 Ill. 203, 162 N. E. 848 (1928). By the instant decision a chose of action
passes in New York. No interest passes in this same state by a devise of realty.
Albatty Hosp. v. Albany Guardian Society and Home for Friendless, supra. A
creditor cannot force a devisee or legatee into accepting or rejecting a gift.
Schoonover v. Osborne, supra.
At common law the interest of a legatee before distribution generally was not
attachable by the legatee's creditors, 4 Am. JuR., Attachment and Garnishment,
g 412 (1936), because beneficiaries do not have full title or the right of possession. Ro- sow oN WILS, §§ 266, 325 (1939). It is uniformly held that a
beneficial legacy is presumed to be accepted. PAGE, WILLS, § 1407 (1941).
There are few cases construing what is a reasonable time within which a
devise or legacy must be accepted. PAGE, WILS, § 1408 (1941). A delay of seven
months was held to be reasonable in Schoonover v. Osborne, supra. In Strom v.
Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917), five years was said to be unreasonable. There seem to be no cases reported that close this gap. (In re Howe, 112
N. J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (1932) held four months to be unreasonable, but that
case involved a question of avoiding inheritance transfer tax.) Kentucky has solved
the problem by limiting by statute the time within which a beneficiary may renounce. Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 98 S. W. 1037 (1907).
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It can be said that the minority opinion tends toward the general common
law views above expressed. The majority relied upon the construction of the
statute and the equitable principle as expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Oliver v. Well5, 254 N. Y. 459, 460, 173 N. E. 679 (1930):
The general principle is that election must be made within a time
that is equitable in the light of all the circumstances. This time may
be very long, if injury to others will not result from the delay, and by
the same token very short if the failure to act promptly may work injury or hardship ....
[citing] 1 Pomeroy Equity Juris. (4th Ed.) § 513;
Halsbury Laws of England, title Equity, §§ 141, 144, and cases there collated.
It would seem that in New York, creditors are included in this category. This
result is realistic. It promotes the fulfillment of legal obligations - or satisfaction of debts. There is no doubt that the instant decision will benefit creditors,
and in the light of our present economic trend, this may well mean that the
Wilson case will have increasing significance.
Francis J. Keating

LABOR LAW - PIcxEvnIG - ENJOINING ONLY VIOLENC OR Arm Prcx:ETnN.Henderson et at. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., .... Ark ..... 217 S. W. (2d) 261

(1949). A permanent injunction enjoining all picketing was here modified to allow
peaceful picketing. The employees of the Southern Cotton Oil Co. were called out
on a strike order. All but five of the 117 workers obeyed the order. To further

enforce their claim and to inform others of it, the union set up a picket line.
On the tenth day of the strike, December 26, 1945, certain members of the union
and those in the picket line began to threaten, coerce, and intimidate persons
bringing cotton seed into the plant. In addition, threats were made to the five

non-striking employees, culminating in an attack upon them by about fifteen of
the strikers. One of the strikers was killed and one of the employees hospitalized.

Because of this outbreak, a temporary injunction was issued prohibiting all
picketing. A motion to make permanent was made by the company on May 28,
1946. A permanent injunction granted on Janury 20, 1948 formed the basis of
this appeal.
The court based its decision to modify on the fact that more than thirtyseven months had passed since the instance of violence. In so modifying, the
court questioned whether ". . . but for the temporary injunction unlawful acts
would have been committed, and whether, if restraint should be removed, violence
would recur." Emphasis was thereby placed not on the coercive effect of such
picketing but on recurrence of violence. Justification of this decision required
consideration of the entire matter of the use of "blanket injunctions" in labor
disputes.
The justification for a blanket injunction is that, without it, any picketing
would have the effect of coercion and intimidation. That is, where past picketing

was of a violent nature, future picketing, though peaceful, is presumed to have
a coercive effect. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, et al v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 294, 61. S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836
(1941); Local Union No. 858 of Hotel and Restaurant Employees International
Alliance v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S. W. (2d) 763, 767 (1947). But see Miller
et al. v. Gallagher et al., 176 Misc. 647, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 606, 609 (1941). From
this point of view it would appear at first glance that the dissenting opinion in
the instant case was correct. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Holt said that on the
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basis of the Jiannas case, wherein a blanket injunction was allowed because of
previous violence, a similar decision should be given here. However, on the facts
presented, the cases are distinguishable. In the Jiannas case there were continued
acts of violence to such a degree that violence was enmeshed with the picketing.
On such basis it would seem that injunctive relief should be granted to fulfill the
purpose as stated in the Meadowmoor case. That case was relied on by the court
in the Jiannas case in arriving at its decision. Where violence is limited to a
"sporadic outburst," a permanent blanket injunction should not be allowed. This
is especially true where a temporary injunction has been strictly followed. See
Lloyd P. Jones, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists, District No. 54,
et a., ....
Ohio St.....
, 75 N. E. (2d) 446 (1947). But where a temporary injunction restraining violence has been violated, the court is justified in restraining
all picketing. Steiner et al. v. Long Beach Local No. 128 of the Oil Workers International Union, et a., 19 Cal. (2d) 676, 123 P. (2d) 20 (1942). The scope of
injunctions should be limited where passage of time has lessened the possibility
of coercive effect: "Further, when the acts of violence are remote in point of
time, as in the instant case, the tendency of the courts has been not to declare a
blanket injunction against all picketing." Rowe Transfer and Storage Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers,
Local Union No. 621, A. F. L. ....
Tenn .....
209 S.W. (2d) 35, 37 (1948).
The right to strike is firmly established in this country. Incident to this right
is the right to picket. These rights in themselves cannot be infringed by unreasonable state action. See American Federation of Labor, et al. v. Swing, et al., 312
V. S.321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941) ; Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132
S. W. 988 (1910). Only lawful means, of course, may be used to solicit support,
and thus it is inconceivable that picketing when accompanied by force and
violence should find support under our laws. Smith, et al. v. State, 207 Ark. 104,
179 S. W. (2d) 185 (1944). Control of picketing as such is limited, however, by
the right to freedom of speech and expression. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of
Chicago, Local 753, et al. v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., supra (dissenting opinion). Where these rights are exceeded by infringement on the rights of others all
picketing should be enjoined, if necessary. See Steiner, et al. v. Long Beach Local
No. 128 of the Ol Workers International Union, et al., 19 Cal. (2d) 676, 123 P.
(2d) 20 (1942); Yale Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Knitgoods Workers Union, Local
190, 334 Pa. 23, 5 A. (2d) 323 (1939). Peaceful picketing should be allowed,
however, whenever it is improbable that serious detriment to better relationships
and the rights of all the parties involved would result. See Douds v. Wine, Liquor
& Distillery Workers Union, Local, et a., 75 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. N. Y. 1948).
This court took into consideration various conditioning factors, such as labor's
rights, previous violence, the time factor, and the general purpose of the blanket
injunction in arriving at its decision, and in so doing achieved a proper balance
of rights, duties, and justice.
John E. Lindberg

ToaTs - Nu ssc. - INjuqcroN - FuNERA PAP.xoR-Devereux, et al. v.
Grand-Americas Junior Corporation,....
Misc .....
, 85 N. Y. S. (2d) 783 (1949).
A supreme court of New York, recognizing that a funeral parlor is not a nuisance
per se, denied an injunction to restrain the establishment of an undertaking busi-.
ness in a semi-residential section zoned for business. In this case the defendants
planned to shield from public view the loading and unloading of all bodies and
caskets under a covered enclosure erected upon its premises. The court held that
where the method of operation is designed to minimize any possible offense to the
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sensibilities of the immediate neighborhood, the depressing effect induced by the
mere presence of a funeral parlor, its unfavorable reception, and the slight inconvenience it may cause are insufficient reasons to warrant an injunction.
Courts generally subordinate the doctrine that one may use his property as
he sees fit to the maxim sic utere tuo ut al.enum non laedas, but in the law of
nuisance this maxim is subject to differing interpretations. With respect to an
undertaking establishment located in a purely residential area, the majority rule
is that such establishment may become a nuisance if its normal operation creates
a constant reminder of death, induces a feeling of depression, appreciably impairs the happiness of the immediate neighborhood, and depreciates the value of
neighboring property. See Arthur v. Virkler, 144 Misc. 483, 258 N. Y. S. 886,
890 (1932) (consciousness of death affects the normal man); Brown v. Arbuckle,
.... Cal. App ..... , 198 P. (2d) 550, 553 (1948) (mental injury); Kundinger v.
Bagnasco, et al., 298 Mich. 15, 298 N. W. 386, 387 (1941); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. (2d) 119, 121 (1940) (constant reminder of death
destroys comfort, well-being, and property rights); and Fraser, et al. v. Fred
Parker Funeral Home, 201 S. C. 88, 21 S. E. (2d) 577, 585 (1942) (emotions
and mental pains are as acute as physical suffering). The minority rule requires
a physical element in the constitution of a nuisance. See Canfield v. Quayle, 170
Misc. 621, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 781, 793 (1939) (requiring a substantial invasion by
inordinate noise); Higgins & Courtney v. Block, 216 Ala. 153, 112 So. 739, 741
(1927) (escaping noxious odors); Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co., 55 Cal. App.
545, 203 Pac. 1015, 1017 (1922) (danger of contagious diseases). See cases collected in Notes, 23 A. L. R. 745 (1923), 43 A. L. R. 1171 (1926), and 87 A.L.R.
1061 (1933), defining the above rules.
The principal case supports the minority rule:
To restrain the conduct of a business not prohibited by statute at the
location in question, the inconvenience to adjoining owners must not be
fanciful, or slight, but must be certain and substantial, and must interfere with the physical comfort of the ordinarily reasonable person.
See Dutt v. Fales, 250 Mich. 579, 230 N. W. 948, 949 (1940) (some noise and
congestion is not sufficient to constitute a nuisance). But see White v. Luquire
Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 129 So. 84, 86 (1930) (reminder of death is a discomfort which is not fanciful or imaginative to the over-sensitive person alone).
Where the character of the neighborhood is transitional or semi-residential, the
courts are apparently inclined to support the minority rule. In Jones v. Chapel
Hill, 273 App. Div. 510, 77 N. Y. S. (2d) 867, 871 (1948), the court did not
allow enlargement of funeral parlor operations because it would offend ordinary
sensibilities. See also Rick, et al. v. Cramp, et ux., 357 Pa. 83, 53 A. (2d) 84, 89
(1947); O'Connor v. Ryan, et al., 159 S. W. (2d) 531, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
But see Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202, 204 (1924) where
the court observed that:
An
of the
offend
would
homes.

undertaking establishment stands on a different footing from that
occasional corer grocery and oil filling station... The latter may
the aesthetic sense of those living in their proximity; the former
destroy, in an essential respect, the comfort and repose of their

The manner of operation is an important factor in determining whether a funeral
parlor is a nuisance. Fentress v. Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S. W. (2d) 18, 19
(1930); Kirk v. Mabis, et al., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N. W. 759, 762 (1933) (the
operator must exercise proper, ordinary, and reasonabli care). See also Medahl
v. Holberg, 55 N. D. 523, 214 N. W. 802, 803 (1927); Jordan v. Nesmith, 132
Okla. 226, 269 Pac. 1096, 1098 (1928); Clutter v. Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144
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S. W. (2d) 119, 122 (1940) (it would be a serious injustice to require one actually to suffer damages before being allowed to seek relief). In connection with
the importance of locality, see Jones v. Chapel Hill, 273 App. Div. 510, 77 N.
Y. S. (2d) 867, 871 (1948); 'Defendant is in a particularly inequitable position
in that it proposes to take advantage of this environment, whose character at
the same time it proposes to destroy"; Medahl v. Holberg, supra, (where the
immediate neighborhood does not make it obnoxious it is merely a business);
Lewis v. Baltimore, et al., 164 Md. 170, 164 Atl. 220, 224 (1933) (to consider
incidents and not location will make it neither a public nor a private nuisance
per se, but it need not be expelled as a nuisance from the viewpoint of either
incidents or location if its unreasonable use justifies exclusion).
just how much the question of laches and good faith has been allowed to influence the decision of this case is difficult to discern. Mr. Justice Nathan disclosed that this question was given serious consideration. The delaying of the
present action until the defendant had expended a substantial sum did not appear
equitable; but an injunction was granted, nevertheless, in Arthur v. Virkler, 144
Misc. 483, 258 N. Y. S. 886 (1932), despite considerable expenditures on the part
of the defendant. The question of good faith was considered more serious than
that of laches. The court admitted that the doubt cast on the plaintiff's good faith
was inferred from insufficient evidence which implicated a competing firm, previously established in the neighborhood, as the'moving inspiration behind the
present action.
The question of good faith involves the element of motive. If, at the discretion of a court, motive is to be a selective factor in determining a decision,
utilitarian policy must be distilled from legal precepts. Motive must be weighed
in the light of sound principles, if the concept of justice is to be persuasive in the
conduct of men. The natural law gives every man the right to earn his livelihood.
Correlative with the possession of such right, society is obliged to secure the exercise of it; this protection ought to issue from the legal system. Any violation
of this natural right could come within the scope of nuisance and an injunction would be an appropriate remedy. But free enterprise cannot recognize
such a right and still retain its inherent theory of unlimited competition. The
naivete of the statement to the effect that:
. . . the utmost caution must be exercised to prevent the possibility of
an apparently bona fide injunction action being used as a subtle instrumentality in restraint of trade,
indicates how deeply the principles of free enterprise have been entrenched into
the legal reasoning of our courts in preference to principles of the natural law.
James D. Matthews

TORTS - LmBnxrzI FOR DEFAmATioN - GRoUP SLANDER-Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc., et al. v. Harland, ....
Miss .....
38 So. (2d) 771 (1949). This was an
action for slander brought by one of three sales clerks employed in the defendant company's store. It was a companion case of Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
et al. v. Blakely, 200 Miss. 81, 25 So. (2d) 585 (1946), and Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc., et al. v. Skinne, 200 Miss. 44, 25 So. (2d) 572 (1946), brought individually by the other two clerks. Plaintiff brought this action for slander al.
leged to have been committed by the assistant manager of the defendant company's store.
It had been called to the attention of the assistant manager that an eight
dollar check and a ten and a twenty dollar bill, were found under a plaque
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near a cash register in the store. After reporting this fact to the manager, the
assistant manager was told to find and discharge the clerk guilty of this carelessness. Failing to obtain a confession from any of the three clerks he suspected, the
assistant manager charged them in a loud voice and in the presence of customers
in these words:
. . . All damned three of you are going out of here this afternoon without a recommendation and with a blot on your record and character...
You are one of three who trifled with the money. You all deny it, but
one of you did it. You laid it and hid it there with ill intentions and
you are fired without a recommendation.
It was further proved that some customers in the store stopped to listen. After
having been discharged, the clerk was unable to obtain work in that area in spite
of the fact that services of a clerk were in demand, that she previously had a
good record, and that the was a proficient sales clerk. The defendant contended
that the assistant manager had a qualified privilege and that the charge wasin
the alternative rather than directed to any particular clerk.
This case is based upon the same facts and governed by the same holding as
the two aforementioned cases. In deciding for one of the other two clerks in
Montgomnery Ward v. Skinner, the court disposed of the first defense by holding
that there was no qualified privilege because the charge by the assistant manager
was not made in good faith, nor in the proper manner and to the proper parties
only. It was found that there were no justifiable grounds for suspecting a clerk
of anything more than carelessness.
In deciding for the plaintiff on the defendant's second defense, the court relied upon the reasoning in Forbes v. Johnson, 50 Ky. 48 (1850), where two persons had been charged in the disjunctive with altering a note. In a civil action
brought by one of the persons defamed, the court held that since each of them
was charged equally, it was in effect a charge against both. The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would allow a willful defamer to make with impunity a
charge in the alternative and cause substantially the same harm as would be
caused by charging them jointly or separately.
Civil recovery for class slander depends to a great extent on the number of
persons in the class. See Note, 21 NoTRE DAm- LAWYER 21 (1945). If a large
class is alluded to disparagingly, it is difficult to show that the defamation is personally applicable to a particular member of that class, and the courts are therefore reluctant to grant relief. In Noral v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 40 Cal. App.
(2d) 348, 104 P. (2d) 860 (1940), an action for libel was brought by the president of Workers' Alliance against the defendant for publishing an article stating
that the officers of that organization were channelling the membership dues to
further Communist agitation under direction from the Third Internationale. Recovery was denied because the defamation was directed at a large group of persons (at least 162 officials), thus precluding determination with any certainty of
the individual accused. In Watts-Wagner Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corporation, 64 F. Supp. 506 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), the defendant charged that an army
of racketeers was sweeping the country selling a fake panacea for battery troubles. Although the plaintiff was selling a battery solution, he was not allowed
to recover because the class was a large one and no recovery could be had unless
the statement was reasonably susceptible of special application to the plaintiff.
The possibilities of recovery for class slander increase as the size of the group
decreases. A small group of doctors constituting a residential staff of a hospital
was allowed to recover in Bornmann v. Star Co., 174 N. Y. 212, 66 N. E. 723
(1903) for defamatory statements made about their group which did not point
out any one of them in particular. The same is true of statements made about
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families in their collective capacity. In Chandler v. Holloway, 4 Port. 17 (Ala.
1836),.it -was held that each member of a family could collect against the defamer who called the family a gang of murderers. While this special treatment of
small groups produces just decisions, it appears to be based not upon the intensity of injury to the reputation of each individual, but on the legal fiction that
in cases where small classes are slandered, each member will be presumed to have
been personally mentioned. See Note, 34 CoL. L. Rav. 1322 (1934). The reason
for this fiction was to prevent the harsh effects of the doctrine laid down in
Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. 475 (N. Y. 1815) to the effect that recovery was
denied unless the person defamed could show special reference to himself.
Where a member or part of a group is impersonally defamed, the courts have
refused to apply this fiction. They have followed the old doctrine of Sumner v.
Buel, regardless of the size of the group. Thus in Harvey v. Coffin, 5 Blackf.
566 (Ind. 1841), where the defendant said that "One of Coffin's boys," had stolen
his corn, the court said that plaintiff had to prove that the defendant alluded to
him, and the fact that the plaintiff was one of the sons was not sufficient. It
seems that all of Coffin's sons were injured by this accusation, whether they were
referred to individually or not. A similar case was that of Bull v. Collins, 54
S. W, (2d) 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). There the plaintiff could not recover for
slanderous remarks made by the defendant manager of a store who charged that
either the plaintiff or another stole money from the store. The court said: "Words
imputing an accusation that either A or B stole money, without indicating
whether the one or the other, are not sufficient to charge that A stole the money."
But who will trust a man so accused? If I suspect that one of two men is a
killer, I will not turn my back to either of them. These decisions show that the
courts were blindly following the doctrine of Sumner v. Buel. They refused to
recognize that the basis of liability for defamation is the injury to the reputation of the plaintiff.
Since the unfavorable impression reasonably created in the mind of the third
party is the essence of the action of slander, it seems correct that the clerk in
Montgomery Ward v. Harland was allowed to recover. See RESTATEMNT, TORTS
§ 564 (1938). Even though nothing was said which would lead another to believe that the plaintiff was guilty to the exclusion of the other two clerks, the
grave suspicion which must have been created in the mind of the customers in
the defendant's store regarding each of the clerks should have been sufficient to
support recovery in an action for slander. To allow recovery, as this court did,
prevents a substantial harm being done to the plaintiff without a remedy therefor.
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court made a distinction between this case
and others involving aternative charges. It was pointed out that in this instance
the plaintiff .was present and the hearer could see the one charged. This does not
seem controlling, since it matters little whether the hearer can see the one
charged or merely knows to whom the reference is made. The court may have
found it easier to say in this case that the authority cited by the opposition was
not on point, but it would have eliminated confusion if the court had openly
admitted that this case is a departure from the majority of cases in point and
that this departure accomplishes, ultimately, justice without fiction.
Lawrence S. May, Jr.

BANKRUPT CY - LImEs PRioRrr oF GOVERNNMNT PERECTED TAX LE AS
VAGE CLAIMS AT DATE OF BANxR -TcY.-Goggin v. Division of Labor

AGAINST

Law Enforcement, of California, ....
U. S.....
69 S.Ct. 469 (1949). This case
holds that United States tax claims are entitled to priority as against wage
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claims when the Collector of Internal Revenue has perfected a tax lien on the
taxpayer's personalty and has actual possession of it before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, even though the Collector subsequently relinquishes possession
of such property to the trustee in bankruptcy for purposes of sale. It was decided that such procedure was not in conflict with the provisions of § 67 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as'amended, 11 U. S. C. § 107 (c) (1946).
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that § 67 (c), in its attempt to protect wage claims and administration expenditures from obliteration by large delinquent tax claims, does not require a collector, under similar circumstances, to
retain possession of the personalty of the bankrupt after the petition in bankruptcy has been filed in order to guarantee the continued priority of the tax lien.
This section reads as follows:
§ 67. Liens and Fraudulent Transfers:
c. Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy . . . though valid under subdivision (b) of this section, statutory
liens, including liens for taxes . . . owing to the United States . . . on
personal property not accompanied by possession . . . shall be postponed
in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
(a) of section 64 of this Act.. . . (Emphasis supplied). [30 STAT. 544
(1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 107 (c) (1946).]
Clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of § 64 of the Act, 30 STAT. 563
(1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 104 (a) (1946), give first priority to the
costs and expenses of administration and second priority to wage claims of workmen, etc.
The facts of the instant case are as follows: prior to filing any voluntary petition in bankruptcy, a Collector of Internal Revenue of the United States perfected a statutory lien upon the personal property of the Kressco Engineering
Corporation, incorporated in California, and took possession of it. On two occasions, the Collector attempted to sell the taxpayer's assets but each time the
bids were unsatisfactory, whereupon the Collector relinquished possession of the
property to the trustee in bankruptcy for sale upon the condition that the Government's lien was to attach to the proceeds of the sale, subject to costs and
expenses.
The referee ordered that the proceeds of the sale be used first to pay the expenses of administration and that the balance was to be surrendered to the Collector in partial payment of the Government's tax claims. The Division of Labor
Law Enforcement, State of California, the statutory assignee of certain prior wage
claimants, appealed from the judgment of the district court. The judgment was
reversed by the court of appeals, 165 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 9th 1947), stating
that the Collector had relinquished possession of the bankrupt's property and ordered that the tax claims be postponed and subordinated to the wage claims pursuant to § 67 (c) of the Act. In so deciding, the court stated:
The government lien holder must either sell the property under its
lien or eventually surrender it into the bankruptcy proceedings. We find
no authority whatever for .the proposition that the government can turn
the property over to the trustee under-a consent based upon the receiver's
assurance that the lien shall continue upon theiroperty-and also upon
the money-it may bring when sold as a part of the bankruptcy estate.
However, it is well established law that it is within the power of the courts
to sell the property of a bankrupt free from liens if it is reasonable to assume
that the property will yield greater profits thereby. In re Beardsley, 38 F. Supp,
799 (Md. 1941). When a trustee sells property free from liens, the lien-holders
are entitled to receive a preference from the proceeds equal to the amount or
value of the property covered by their liens. In re Wesley Corporation, 18 F.
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Supp. 347 (E. D. Ky. 1937); cf. In re Wilkes, Leslie v. Knight Soda Fountain
Co., 55 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 2nd 1932). A creditor's rights to a bankrupt's estate
are frozen by the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Thus, the decision in In re
Wissmneier, 26 F. Supp. 806 (E. D. N. Y. 1939), asserts that the priorities in a
bankruptcy proceeding must be determined as of the time of bankruptcy and,
according to § 1 (13) of the Act, "time of bankruptcy refers to the date when
the petition is filed. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 1 (13)
(1946). In view of these decisions, it would appear that the Collector's lien
priority was well established at the time of bankruptcy and such priority could
not be altered when the personalty of the bankrupt was relinquished by the Collector to the trustee for sale after the bankruptcy petition had been fled.
The court of appeals in the instant case, citing City of New York v. Hall, 139r
F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 2nd 1944), held that the world "possession," as used in
§ 67 (c) of the Act, means actual possession, since it is the purpose of this section to protect creditors and warn them of the fact that a lien exists on the property in question. The court was side-tracked in its discussion of the Hall case
since in that case there was no actual possession by the lien-holder. Thus, the
Hall case is distinguished from the instant case and the true holding of the for-

mer was that possession was required by § 67 (c) of the Act as a penalty for the
inaction of the tax authorities.
Since a trustee in bankruptcy acquires no better title to the bankrupt's prop-

erty than the bankrupt himself had, it would not seem logical to conclude that
the lien of the Collector was affected by bankruptcy proceedings. Nor would it
seem logical to conclude that the Collector lost his lien priority when he relinquished possession of the bankrupt's personalty since, as has been previously
stated, the priority of the tax lien was determined once and for all at the inception of the bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy proceedings take place in a
court of equity, and holders of valid liens have a statutory right to preferred
treatment. In re Bowen, 46 F. Supp. 631 (E. D. Pa. 1942); cf. In re Erie R. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 237 (E. D. Ohio 1940). Claims constituting valid and existing liens
on the bankrupts property at the time of bankruptcy, which are not invalidated
by the Act, are entitled to priority and payment in full from the property covered by the liens or the proceeds of such property, not only before the claims
of general creditors, but also before payment of claims designated in § 64
of the Act relating to priorities. In re Centralia Refining Co., 35 F. Supp. 599
(E. D. Ill. 1940).
For reasons of policy then, it would be inequitable to require a trustee to
sell the property of a bankrupt subject to a lien since it would operate to the
detriment of the unsecured creditors as well as the statutory lien-holders. The
lien-holders would be required to retain actual possession of the chattels to be
assured of full priority and the property would undoubtedly yield a lessor price
if sold subject to liens.
From a review of the cases already cited, it would seem that it was the intent
of the legislators of § 67 (c) of the Act to protect uninformed claimants from
dormant tax claims which often swallow up the residue of a bankrupt's estate.
To remedy. such situations, § 67 (c) was enacted, requiring statutory Hen-holders
to have actual possession of the property subject to the lien so that other creditors

might be informed of the lien. •
The Court in the instant case felt that the creditors of the bankrupt had ample
warning and notice of the Government's tax lien after the Collector had, on two
previous occasions, attempted to sell the personalty of the bankrupt. The Government's tax lien in this case did not arise out of the bankruptcy of the taxpayer, but rather from delinquent taxes accruing prior to the petition in bankruptcy.
Maurice J. Moriarty
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Cm ms AcT.-Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Rentzel et at., 81 F. Supp. 611 (E. D.

Va. 1948). The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Board issued a regulation
which prohibited racial segregation at the Washington National Airport. The
plaintiff was a restaurant operator at the airport and operated under a lease from
the administrator. He claimed that the federal criminal code adopted the racial
segregation laws of Virginia under the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act and therefore invalidated the regulation of the administrator. The plaintiff sought to determine the validity of the regulation and to restrain its enforcement. This case
thus presented the question whether .the federal criminal code adopted racial segregation and applied it to federal enclaves that are located within states that require such segregation.
The Washington National Airport is located within the boundaries of Virginia,
but it was put under exclusive federal jurisdiction by the provisions of 59 STAT.
553 (1945), which provided that:
Sect. 107: The State of Virginia hereby consents that exclusive jurisdiction in the Washington National Airport ... title to which is now in
the United States shall be in the United States.
This was confirmed by the Virginia General Assembly in Va. Acts 1946, c. 26, p. 46.
The authority of the administrator to make regulations for the airport is contained in 54 STAT. 686 (1940), which reads:
Sect. 2. The Administrator shall have control over, and responsibility
for, the care, operation, maintenance, and protection of the airport, together with the power to make and amend such rules and regulations as
he may deem necessary to the proper exercise thereof.
It is contended that the federal criminal code required racial segregation at
the airport. The federal code is said to have adopted the provisions of the Code
of Virginia, which did have this provision, VA. CoDE AwN. §§ 1796a, 1796b (1942),
by the action of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. This Act was intended to
provide each federal reservation with a criminal code for its local government by
filling in the gaps in the federal criminal code through the application of local
state statutes. The Act provides that:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter
reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title is guilty of any
act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment
of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession or District in which such
place is situated by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act
or omission shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment. [62 STAT. 645, U. S. CODE CONG. Smv., Unbound Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1948).]
Does this statute adopt the racial segregation laws of Virginia and require their
enforcement in federal areas within Virginia? The court held that the Virginia
laws for separation of the white and colored races were not adopted by the federal
code.
The court stated that the purpose of the Assimilative Crimes Act was to fill
in gaps in the federal criminal code. It could not be used to adopt state laws
where a federal law already existed or where there was a federal policy at variance with the state law. Where Congress had legislated, there could be no question of supplanting that act by a state act. Where there was no positive federal
law, but a federal policy, the federal policy would still prevail over the state law.
The Federal Assimilative Crimes Act could only be invoked where Congress had
not legislated by either law or pronouncement of policy.
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In Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U. S. 383, 389, 64 S. Ct. 622, 90
L. Ed. 966 (1944), the Supreme Court asked several questions for the purpose of
testing the application of the Assimilative Crimes Act to the prohibition laws of
Oklahoma:
This statute, it is said, adopts all of the various penal statutes of Oklahoma relating to liquor and makes them the federal law applicable to the
Fort Sill Reservation . . . Petitioner's argument raises at least three distinct questions, no one of which is easily resolved: (1) Which, if any of
the Oklahoma penal statutes are so designed that they could be adopted
by the assimilative crimes statute and applied to Fort Sill? . . . (2) If
there are Oklahoma statutes which could be so adopted, are all or any of
them in conflict with federal policies as expressed by Acts of Congress...?
(3) Assuming that certain Oklahoma statutes are adaptable, and are not
inconsistent with federal policies would such statutes make. penal the
liquor transaction stipulated to have taken place?
The provisions of the Virginia Segregation Laws would certainly require an
affirmative answer to the second question. The policy of the Federal Government
has been to grant equal protection to all persons without regard to their race. One
of the strongest affirmations of that policy was stated in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and another was in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, REv. STAT. § 1978 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 42 (1946). In Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U. S. 24, 34-35, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948), the Supreme Court in
deciding that one of the policies of the federal government is the avoidance of
racial discrimination in federal matters, said:
But even in the absence of the statute [Civil Rights Act of 1866]
there are other considerations which indicate that enforcement of restrictive covenants in these cases is judicial action contrary to the public
policy of the United States ... The power of the federal court to enforce
the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the
restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States as
manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable
legal precedents.
It would seem illogical to hold that the Congress of the United States simply
took over completely all the state laws by the terms of the Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act. The court was on sound ground in holding that the Act did not
adopt a law contrary to the public policy of the United States. It acted reasonably in upholding the right of the administrator to make necessary rules and in
dismissing the complaint.
George J. Murphy, Jr.

Domsmc Rar.,ATIoNs-DIvoRcE--CusoDY or C zRam AwmAEDm To AovuLRous Wn-ABus - op Disc xoN.-Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N. Y. 391, 83 N. E. (2d)
848 (1949). This was an appeal from a divorce action granting custody of two

teen-age daughters to an adulterous mother. The question before the court was
whether there had been an abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding such
custody. The plaintiff-husband was awarded an absolute divorce on grounds of
his wife's adultery. Custody of two daughters, eleven and thirteen years of age,
was granted to the defendant-wife, with whom they expressed a desire to live,
though they professed love for both parents. The appellate court, by a four to
two decision, affirmed the trial court's finding. The court of appeals reversed this
decision as to custody and support by a four to two majority, holding that the
award to the adulterous mother was such an abuse of discretion as to be an error
of law.
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It is well settled that trial courts have broad discretionary powers in determining
which one of the parents is best fitted to have custody of the children. Matter of
Welch, 74 N. Y. 299 (1878). The general view is that the trial judge's close personal contact with the parties to the action, the children involved, the witnesses,
and his first hand knowledge of all the facts, place him in a better position to determine the issue. Consequently, his decision usually will not be disturbed. But
such a judgment is not absolute, and the law and facts may be reviewed by the
higher courts at the instance of either party when the judgment rendered is inconsistent with the best interests of the children. N. Y. Crx PRA TrcE ACT § 1170.
In deciding which party is best fitted to insure the proper physical, moral, and
mental development of the children, the court considers many factors. The property of the parents, their moral fitness, their past conduct and devotion to the
children, and the age, sex, love and preferences of the children, are all elements of
varying importance which guide the trial judge in making his decision. And while
he has wide latitude in evaluating each of the factors in relation to the others, if
the resulting judgment deviates greatly from policy and sound reasoning, it becomes the duty of the higher court to correct such error.
As a general rule, custody is granted to the innocent party, Lester v. Lester,
178 App. Div. 205, 165 N. Y. S. 187, aff'd, 222 N. Y. 546, 118 N. E. 1065 (1917),
but the best interests of the child will sometimes warrant an award to the party
against whom the decree is granted. However, where such an award has been
made, the decision generally has been justified by the presence of other circumstances which leave no doubt as to the reasonableness of the judgment. Thus in
Osterhoudt v. Osterhoudt, 28 Misc. 285, 59 N. Y. S. 797 (1899), aff'd, 168 N. Y.
358, 61 N. E. 285 (1901), while the husband was granted a divorce on grounds of
adultery, custody of the children was given to the wife because of the latter's belief in the validity of a foreign divorce decree and subsequent marriage, in addition
to the fact that the children had always been in her good care. Custody has also
been given the guilty party in cases where there was proof that the other party
was unfit, Burritt v. Burritt, 53 Misc. 24, 102 N. Y. S. 475 (1907); and where
there was but a single moral lapse in an otherwise spotless record, and also doubt
as to the successful party's moral character, Kruczek v. Kruczek, 264 App. Div.
242, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 289, aff'd, 289 N. Y. 826, 47 N. E. (2d) 434 (1943); and
where there was doubt as to the legitimacy of the child, V ............ v. V.............
179 Mic. 970, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 579 (1943).
In the present case, however, the mother was not only proved guilty of adultery and perjury, but professed a belief that the practice of adultery by sexually
dissatisfied wives was to be condoned. In addition, she showed no repentance for
her wrongdoings and gave no indication that she would refrain from'such acts in
the future. On the other hand, the moral fitness of the father was unquestioned,
the lower court holding that he was a lit and proper person to have such custody.
Past decisions hold that the custody of the children should not be granted to a
mother who is morally unfit or degenerate. People ex rel. Wright v. Gerow et al.,
136 App. Div. 824, 121 N. Y. S. 652 (1910), People ex rel. Lawson v. Lawson,
111 App. Div. 473, 98 N. Y. S. 130 (1906).
The trial judge placed great emphasis on the preferences of the children. - According to precedent, the children's wishes, where they express love for both parents, will have little weight, People ex rel. Elder v. Elder, 98 App. Div. 224, 90
N. Y. S. 703 (1904), except where -the claims of the parties are otherwise equal,
Israel v. Israel,38 Misc. 335, 77 N. Y. S. 912 (1902). Their preferences should not
be given much consideration unless the children are of sufficient age and discretion to have an intelligent opinion. Cariola v. Cariola, 131 Misc. 66, 225 N. Y. S.
692 (1927). It could hardly be deemed reasonable to hold that a mother who believed in and practiced adultery was a fit person, with a claim to the custody of
the children equal to that of a reputable and successful father. Nor could two
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adolescent girls be expected to have the capacity correctly to decide which parent
would best serve their future welfare.
In the court of appeals, Judge Fuld stated in his dissenting opinion, "Likewise
pertinent was proof that the wife was ever a good and devoted mother; that her
indiscretions were unknown to the children .... " It is not logical to assume that a
woman can be a good mother and an adulteress at the same time. The primary
duty of any mother is to educate her children in basic moral principles. One who
does not possess these principles" can hardly be expected to teach them to others.
Furthermore, how long would two inquisitive young girls remain sheltered from
their mother's "indiscretions"? The judge's additional remarks appear to be insignificant in the light of the other factors already discussed.
It is indeed exceedingly difficult to prescribe what constitutes a reversible abuse
of discretion in decisions of this kind. But the court should not sacrifice justice
in adhering to a "hands-off" policy as suggested in Judge Fuld's dissent. It seems
evident in this case that the lower court's unreasonable evaluation of the facts and
its failure to take cognizance of past decisions constituted an abuse of discretion
which the court of appeals wisely corrected. Had the final decision been otherwise, it would have established authority. tending to make the discretionary powers
of trial judges more arbitrary. A different decision would also have granted the
lower courts license to assign little value to the parent's moral character, a most
important consideration in determining the proper party to have custody of the
children.
Wifliam J. O'Connor

REAL PROPERTY-SURrACE WATERS-PRoPERTY OwNER CANNOT DISCHARGE SURFACE WATERS IN MmANNER INzURious TO PROPERTY Oi? NEIGnBoRs.-Staats et. al. V.

Hubbard et at., ....DeL..., 63 A. (2d) 856 (1949).

This was an action brought in

the Court of Chancery in Delaware for damages and also to enjoin defendants
from diverting their drainage and surface waters onto the land of the plaintiff.

The court denied a motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint.
In this dispute between neighbors over the flow of surface waters from one
property to another, the plaintiffs complained that defendants raised the level of
their land and thereby caused surface waters to flow onto plaintiff's land in damaging quantities during heavy rains. The motion to dismiss the complaint was
denied by the Vice-Chancellor, who indicated in his decision that -he thought the
plaintiffs had an equitable claim for relief. He cited the case of Chorman v.
Queen Anne's R. Co., 3 Pennewill 407, 54 AtI. 687 (1901), in which it was held
that a railroad company had no right, through its duty to passengers or shippers
to protect its roadbed, to dig ditches alongside its track embankment, thereby
accumulating surface water and casting it on adjacent land in unnatural quantities.
The term "surface water" is used to refer to water derived from falling rain or
melting snow and diffused over the surface of the ground while it remains in such
diffused state or condition. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Emmert, 53 Neb. 237, 73
N. W. 540 (1897). Three divergent views have been taken by the courts with regard to the discharge of surface waters. The first view is called the "common
enemy" doctrine, and its adherents hold the surface waters to be a common enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as best he can. Neither the
retention, diversion, repulsion, nor altered transmission of surface waters is an
actionable injury under this view, even though damage ensues. Nathanson v.
Wagner et ux., 118 N. 5. Eq. 390, 179 Atl. 466 (1935).
In the early Massachusetts case of Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106, 87 Am.
Dec. 625 (1865), the court stated that it was not material whether a party ob-
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structs or changes the direction and flow of surface water by preventing it from
coming within the limits of his land, or by erecting barriers, or by changing the
level of the soil. so as to turn it off in a new course after it has come within his
boundaries. "The obstruction of surface water or an alteration in the flow of it
affords no cause of action in behalf of a person who may suffer loss or detriment
therefrom against one who does no act inconsistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own soil." It was further affirmed in Durkes v. Town of Undon, 38
N. J. Law 21 (1875), that the diversion of surface water, even when such a diversion injured another, was not an actionable wrong. The court somewhat enlarges upon the reasoning leading to this view in the case of Lare et al. v. Young
et al., 153 Pa. Super. 28, 33 A. (2d) 662 (1943). In this case it was held that an
owner may not proceed negligently so as to do unnecessary damage to others, but
insofar as he acts upon his right to protect his enjoyment of his own property, any
incidental loss to his neighbor is damnum.absque injuria. The court further stated:
"Owners of lots in cities and towns buy and own with the manifest condition that
natural or existing surface is liable to be changed by the progress of municipal
development."
It is this very point that constitutes the well-recognized exception to the second
and opposing view, which is called the "civil law" rule. This view holds that the
upper land-owner has a right to the uninterrupted passage from his land of water
caused by falling rain or melting snow, and such flow or passage cannot be arrested or deterred to the detriment of either the upper land-owner or another.
Whitman et al., State Roads Commission v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A. (2d) 630
(1943). The reason for the exception to the general rule in the cases concerning
cities and towns is that this rule is generally associated with agriculture and good
husbandry, and is considered necessary to protect arable land against other than
the natural flow of waters. Cities and towns employ drains and sewers to eliminate excess waters, and therefore the strict interpretation that generally accompanies the civil law rule is neither necessary nor reasonable. The courts following
the civil law rule stress the flowing of surface waters in the natural course and
manner, undiverted and unaccelerated by interference. It has been held that the
act of flooding the lands of an upper owner is wrongful per se, although it may
actually have caused benefit instead of injury. Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247,
10 Am. Rep. 732 (1871). The rigidity of this rule is again emphasized in Pettigrew v. Evansvle, 25 Wis. 223, 3 Am. Rep. 50 (1870), where the court held that
it was the duty of every owner of land wishing to carry off the surface water
from his own land to do so without material injury or detriment to the lands of
his neighbor. Thus it has been held that one may not grade his land in such a
manner as to cause water ordinarily falling on his land to run upon the land of another. Adams v. Walker, 34 Conn. 466, 91 Am. Dec. 742 (1867). This principle
was later affirmed in Tide Water Oil Sales Corp. v.Shimelman et al., 114 Conn.
182, 158 AtI. 229 (1932).
A number of states have declined to accept either of these views, qualifying the
common enemy doctrine in accordance with the maxim that "one must so use
his property as not unnecessarily to injure others," and modifying the civil law
rule to the extent of permitting a property owner to repel surface water when
such action is reasonably necessary for the protection of his property. In these
states it is held that while surface water may be fended off if done reasonably and
with the exercise of due care, liability arises if the natural flow is obstructed negligently, wantonly or unreasonably. Baker v. Allen, 66 Ark. 271, 50 S.W. 511
(1899). In Rutka v. Rzegocki et al., 132 Conn. 319, 43 A. (2d) 658 (1945), the
court held that a landowner must not use or improve his land in such a way as
to increase the total volume of surface water flowing from it to adjacent property,
thereby discharging this water upon such property in a manner different in volume
or course from its natural flow, to the substantial damage of the adjoining owner.
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It is this middle-of-the-road doctrine of reasonable use which the Vice-Chancellor in the present case appears to advocate when he quotes a previous article:
"Where, however, there has been an act of man which has altered or accelerated
the flow of natural surface water to the plaintiff's land, there has been a tendency
to make the question of liability depend on the doctrine of reasonable user." Noel,
Nuisances from Land in its Natural Condition, 56 HAnv. L. REV. 772 (1943).
In his conclusion that the complaint states a claim for equitable relief, the
Vice-Chancellor sees the governing principle of law in this field reflecting the practical adjustment of conflicting interests, thus requiring one to be conscious of the
effect of his actions on his neighbors.
In the light of the existent sectional divergence among the courts, perhaps the
best conclusion that could be made on this question is contained in 3 FAsRNAva
WATERS AwD WATER RPGs § 889 (1st ed. 1904), referring to the disposition of
surface waters: "Each case must be dealt with upon its facts, applying the rule
cvhich will be reasonable under the circumstances, and under the general rule that
water should be allowed, as far as possible, to seek its natural outlet."

Charles James Perrin
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PLoyM" T.-Simon v. Standard Oil Co., -.-Neb...., 36 N. W. (2d) 102 (1949).
Within the provisions of the workmen's compensation acts, an employee injured by
an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is entitled to disability benefits. This case holds that an employee's injury, proximately resulting
from his voluntarily exposing himself to risk of harm, entirely foreign to any
reasonable requirement of his employment, is not compensable as arising out of
and in the course of the employment.
Plaintiff, an employee of the defendant company, received a severe hand injury
from the blades of an electric exhaust fan. The paint room, in which the fan had
recently been installed, and the wash room, in which the plaintiff normally carried
out the duties of his employment, were located side by side in the same building on
defendant's premises. He was not prohibited from going into the adjacent paint
room, but had only occasional duties to perform there. The exhaust fan was installed some thirty feet from the doorway in the room's far comer. On the day
of the accident the plaintiff completed his duties about 3:30 P. M., but did not
immediately leave the premises. Instead, he made his way into the paint room to
inspect the new fan, and there placed his hand in close proximity to it in order
"to see how much air it was pulling through." He suffered the injury for which
compensation is claimed when the suction drew his hand into the whirling blades.
The primary question presented was whether the plaintiff's accidental injury "arose
out of and in the course of his employment," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Nebraska. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 48-101 (1943); J 48151(6) (Supp. 1947).
Willful negligence is the only defense available in Nebraska once the requirement that the employee's accidental injury "arose out of and in the course of"
the employment is satisfied. The term "willful negligence," as applicable to the
instant case, is defined as,

". ..

(a) deliberate act, (b) such conduct as evidences

reckless indifference to safety ... ." NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-155(7) (Supp. 1947).
The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" are not equivalent in meaning, and an injury occurring in the course of the employment does not necessarily
mean that it also arises out of the employment. The statute imposes a dual requirement and both must be met before compensation will be allowed. Courts
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have distinguished the terms in deciding numerous cases since the institution of
workmen's compensation acts. The distinction was aptly put in the early case
of Speas v. Boone County, 119 Neb. 58, 227 N. W. 87, 88 (1929), where the
court said:
an injury "arises out of" an employment when there is a reasonable
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is, in
all circumstances, required to be performed and the injury is received
while the employee is thus engaged; and that the injury is received "in
the course of" the employment when, at the time the injury is received,
the workman is engaged at the work he is employed to perform or in some
duty incidental to that work. If incidental, it must be incidental to the
main character of the business on which the employee was engaged for
the employer. It cannot occur independent of the relation of master and
servant.
...

In the Simon case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the judgment of
the district court sustaining an award of compensation in favor of the plaintiff.
In reaching its final decision, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff was not
engaged in the performance of any of the required duties of his employment, or
any work even incidental thereto at the time of the accident, and that he searched
out the cause of his injury on his own initiative, urged on by his personal curiosity, the relationship of master and servant was severed, and the injury received
was not compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. The
decision is in agreement with the holdings in countless cases involving the same
question in this and other jurisdictions. Saucier's Case, 122 Me. 325, 119 Ad. 860
(1923) ; cf. Bergantzel v. Union Transfer Co., 124 Neb. 200, 245 N. W. 593 (1932) ;
cf. Maronofsky's Case, 234 Mass. 343, 125 N. E. 565 (1920). In Sullivan's Case,
128 Me. 353, 147 At. 431 (1929), an eighteen year old boy, who was employed in
a woolen mill, suffered the loss of four fingers and part of his thumb when, for
the sole purpose of satisfying his curiosity, entirely independent of any required or
incidental duty of his employment, he placed his hand in a machine used to sheer
nap from cloth. The court in that case found that the injury did not arise out of
and in the course of the employment, thereby precluding recovery. In a more recent case containing fundamentally the same factual situation, compensation was
awarded. Bernier v. GreenvXle Mills, lIn., 93 N. H. 165,37 A. (2d) 5 (1944). The
court decided in favor of the plaintiff in that case because he was not expressly
forbidden to inspect the machine, because he was returning from the performance
of a duty of his employment when his curiosity urged him on to his injury, because he was not acquainted with the nature of the machine, and because it might
reasonably be expected that a boy of the plaintiff's age, experience, and apparent
mentality would stop to inspect the machine in operation. Notwithstanding the
apparent validity of the reasons pointed out by the court for awarding compensation, it appears that the view taken approaches an even more liberal interpretation
of workmen's compensation laws.
Justice Carter dissented from the majority holding in the instant case. He
was of the opinion that the terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" should
be given a more liberal construction in order to effectuate the intent of the legislature and to reflect the very purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act: to
make compensable those accidental injuries connected with the employment for
which liability had previously been denied. His reasons for deciding in favor of
the plaintiff correspond in some respects to the bases upon which the compensation award was granted in the previously mentioned Bernier case. At this juncture,
cognizance should be taken of the fact that, although the existing act has greatly
enlarged the employer's liability, thus relieving the employee of the burdens and
2e=e of litigating his own cause of action, it has defined certain definite limitations beyond which the employer will not be held accountable. One of these limi-
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tations, and by far the most important one, is that the injury must "arise out of
and in the course of" the employment in order to be compensable. These are the
very words contained in the Nebraska Act. According to Justice Carter, the injury which befell the plaintiff should have been anticipated by his employer. The
plaintiff was not prohibited from entering the room in which he was injured. It
was a known fact that man is, by nature, an inquisitive being. Furthermore, in
liberally construing the Nebraska Act, the only conclusion Justice Carter could
derive was that the injury was incidental to the employment, and therefore compensable.
Apparently, if there is any reasonable connection between a dangerous activity
or condition, within the scope or sphere of the employment, and the employee's
injury, sufficient grounds are established for a compensation award. The present
trend is toward a more liberal construction of statutes applying the already strict
liability of workmen's compensation acts. It is conceivable, therefore, that an
employer will eventually become subjected to a form of absolute liability. In
the instant case, the majority of the court was not willing to, liberalize to such a
degree as to declare the plaintiff's injury compensable as arising out of and in the
course of his employment, since they felt that he had clearly severed the employment relationship and went on a frolic of his own. To allow recovery in such a
case, which was the professed intention of the dissenting justice, would effectively
charge the employer with insuring the good health of his employees. True, liberal
construction is to be favored, but liberalization cannot proceed to oppose the very
wording of the Act without destroying the Act's validity and effectively reducing
it to a worthless scrap of j aper. The position of the dissenting justice appears
to be untenable on the facts of the case. In a commendable effort to promote
the spirit of the law and allow recovery in the situation here presented, the dissenting justice has gone to such lengths as to lose sight of the fundamental principles upon which compensation is allowed. In considering the extremes of liberal
construction, the final decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court seems in accord
with a reasonable and fair interpretation of the present Workmen's Compensation
Act.
Albert R. Ritcher

CoNsTrIuroNAL LAw-LABOR LAw---"Riorr xo WORxt" AxED=NTS.-Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, American Federation of Labor, et al. v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., et al.; Whitaker et al v. State of North Carolina,
_U. S....., 69 S. Ct. 251 (1949); American Federationof Labor et al. v. American
Sash & Door Co. et al, ....U. S__, 69 S. Ct. 258 (1949). Long awaited because
of their vital effect on fifteen state statutes, the decisions relative to the "Right to
Work" Amendments, as they are popularly known, were delivered by the United
States Supreme Court on January 3, 1949. The Court, with Mr. Justice Black
writing the opinion, was unanimous in sanctioning the validity of the Nebraska
constitutional amendment and the North Carolina statute, and rendered an eight
to one decision (with Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting) upholding the Arizona
statute. Mr. Justice Black most ably defined the so-called "Right to Work"
amendments, saying: "Precisely what these state laws do is to forbid employers
acting alone or in concert with labor organizations deliberately to restrict employment to none but union members."
Actually, the primary question with which the Court was concerned was the
due process issue: Does the Due Process Clause forbid a state to pass laws clearly
designed to safeguard the opportunities of non-union members to get and hold jobs,
free from discrimination against them because they are non-union members? The
Court answered this unequivocally in the negative.
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A seemingly endless controversy has raged over the interpretation and use of
the term "closed shop." Undoubtedly there has been, and still is, a social stigma
implied in the connotation of the term. Consequently unionists have long favored
the appellation "preferential shop" in lieu of the semantically unsavory "closed
shop." For the purposes of clarity and this discussion, the following definition
will govern:
A dosed shop, as popularly understood in the United States, is a place
of employment where none but union members may work. 3 ENCYcLoPEDEA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 568, 570 (1937).
With the inception of the 1929 Nevada statute, Nav. Cosa. LAws ANN. § 10473,
(1929), many state legislatures have been, and remain solicitous concerning the role
of the non-union employee. Just as the infamous "yellow-dog contracts" were
eventually legislated out of existence by the Norris-LaGuafdia Act,47 STAT. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1946), it would appear that the public policy section therein,
which barred employers from entering into non-enforceable understandings, may be
reciprocally applied to the validity of the present state statutes. Thus, the state
legislatures and the courts would be entitled to prevent employer-union contracts
which preclude employing or retaining a non-union member, for the NorrisLaGuardia Act specifically reads "...
wherefore . . . he should be free to decline
to associate with his fellows ....
In support of this reasoning, a recent United States Supreme Court case, decided subsequent to the cases under discussion, broached the question of the Commerce Clause, wherein the Court said:
No serious question is presented by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution standing alone. It never has been thought to prevent the state
legislatures from limiting "individual and group rights of aggression and
defense" or from substituting "processes of justice for the more primitive
method of trial by combat." [International Union, U. A. W., A. F. of L.,
Local 232 et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board et al .. U.
S.....,
69 S. Ct. 516 (1949).]
Non-enforceability of existent contracts between employers and unions was
contested in the instant cases on the ground of violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGtdre, 219
U. S. 549, 570-571, 31 S. Ct. 259, 55 L. Ed. 328 (1910), which states:
The legislature, provided it acts within its constitutional authority, is
the arbiter of the public policy of the state... While the court, unaided
by legislative declaration, and applying the principles of common law,
may uphold or condemn contracts in the light of what is conceived to be
public policy, its determination as a rule for future action must yield to
the legislative will when expressed in accordance with the organic law,
the Court said the legislation did no more than protect both union and non-union
members from discrimination. Since the states have such constitutional power, it
follows they also have power to ban contracts which, if performed, would lead to
the barred discrimination.
A major, and rather devious allegation posed by the unions, was the contention
that the state laws indirectly infringe their constitutional rights of speech, assembly
and petition, as guaranteed by the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The unions reasoned that a "dosed shop is indispensable to achievement of
sufficient union membership to put unions and employers on a full equality for
collective bargaining. . . ." From a purely statistical viewpoint it is propitious to
pause here to review union membership strength over the twenty-year period ending in 1948.
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Union organizing culminated in a total membership of approximately 15,600,000
of a total of 50,400,000 employed in 1948, or a ratio of three out of ten; whereas,
in 1928 the figures were 3,567,000; 35,505,000; and one out of ten, respectively. A
cursory analysis of the above figures shows that the unions more than trebled their
membership while the total employed in the United States increased by less than
half. The union membership totals and the total employment figures for 1948
are taken from Mimaaasnx or LABOR UMONS IN THE UN TED STATES, U. S. Dept.
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (mimeographed pamphlet); the employment
figures for 1928 are taken from Employment and Unemployment of the Labor
Force, 1900-1940, 2 CONTERENCE BOARD REcoRD 77, 80 (1940).

Indeed, a most vivid imagination would be required to conjecture as to the
possibilities of a decline in union strength in view of these figures.
the Court dispatched the argument saying:

In any event,

The constitutional right of workers to assemble, to discuss and formulate plans for furthering their own self interest in jobs cannot be construed as a constitutional guarantee that none shall get and hold jobs except those who will join in the assembly or will agree to abide by the
assembly's plans.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, more than corroborated the
Court's basic premises when he mentioned the extant principles of collective bargaining in Great Britain and Sweden, where no such uncompromising demands for
contractually guaranteed security exist. He also, significantly, relied in great part
on the writings, opinions and teachings of the late, great Mr. Justice Brandeis. A
most important summary of Mr. Justice Brandeis' views on unionism was made
in 1905, at which time he said:
It is not true that the "success of a labor union" necessarily means a
"perfect monopoly." The union, in order to attain and preserve for its
members industrial liberty, must be strong and stable. It need not include
every member of the trade. Indeed, it is desirable for both the employer
and the union that it should not. Absolute power leads to excesses and to
weakness: Neither our character nor our intelligence can long bear the
strain of unrestricted power. The union attains success when it reaches
the ideal condition, and the ideal condition for a union is to be strong and
stable, and yet to have in the trade outside its own ranks an appreciable
number of men who are non-unionist. In any free community the diversity of character, of beliefs, of taste-indeed mere selfishness-will insure
such a supply, if the enjoyment of this privilege of individualism is protected by law. Such a nucleus of unorganized labor will check oppression by the union as the union checks oppression by the employer.
[Quoted from Louis D. Brandeis' contribution to a discussion entitled
Peace With Liberty and Justice in 2 NAT. Civic FEDERATiON REv., No. 2,
pp. 1, 16 (May 15, 1905).]
Without doubt Mr. Justice Frankfurter achieved a notable personal coup by
referring to the UNivERsAL. DECLARATION or Hu AN RiGHTS, art. 20, cl. 2, adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 11, 1948, declaring
that "No one shall be compelled to belong to an association." This declaration, in
a few words, summarized the whole public policy outlook of the Court.
The legislative fruit of the instant decisions may well be the passage of similar
"Right to Work" Amendments in heretofore hesitant state legislatures, who have
guided their legislative calendars with a wary "wait and see" intent. Unions
surely should not have cause for concern, nor to sound the alarums, declaring an
anti-union trend, inasmuch as thirteen states, thus far, have rejected similar proposals, sometimes repeatedly.
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However, if the pendulum of policy should swing to such a degree that discrimination or collusion, to the detriment of the unions, again occurs, the Court
may abrogate any state legislation that exceeds constitutional power under the guise
of policy.
Henry Martin Shine, Jr.
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Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, ....
,Ga......
51 S. E. (2d) 669 (1949). This
was an appeal from the granting of an injunction which restrained defendant in
certain particulars, and on judgment sustaining a demurrer to the answer, one
portion of which stated that the contract in question was contrary to public policy,
the decision of the trial court was reversed.
Defendant, a veteran-trainee, was employed by the plaintiff exterminating company. Several days after beginning work, he was required to sign a contract with
the employer in which he covenanted not to engage in the same line of business
within a seventy-five mile radius of certain cities in Georgia for a period of one
year after his employment was terminated. Defendant subsequently resigned, and
immediately thereafter took a similar job with a competing company in continuance of his on-the-job training. This was a bill to enjoin defendant from violating
his agreement. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was engaged in soliciting
customers within the territory embraced in the terms of the contract.
The court held the contract unenforceable as contrary to public policy, unreasonable as to the excessiveness of the territory included, and otherwise unreasonable under the particular facts of the case.
A Georgia statute, GA. CODE, § 20-504 (1933), provides: "Contracts against
public policy; . . . A contract which is against-the policy of the law cannot be
enforced; such are . . . contracts in general restraint of trade. .. ."
It is recognized everywhere that a contract in restraint of trade must be reasonable. There are numerous decisions to the effect that in order for a contract
of this nature to be valid, it must be reasonable as to time and place, and not
otherwise unreasonable. If the contract is unreasonable in any one of these particulars, it is invalid. National Linen Service Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175
S. E. 460 (1934). In such instances, the reasonableness of the covenant is always
a matter for the court to pass on, not the jury. Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620, 128
S. E. 891 (1925).
In passing on this question, the court cited Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188,
30 S. E. 735 (1898), as laying down the general test to which such covenants are
subjected. There it was said: "The court will consider the nature and extent of the
trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all other circumstances." With
respect to the parties involved, therefore, the court must take into account whether
the restraint is greater than is necessary for the reasonable protection of the party
seeking relief, the effect of the restriction on the party to be enjoined, and whether it may so affect the interests of the public as to be contrary to public policy.
In the instant case, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in not enjoining the defendant within the entire territory specified. There seemed no
sound basis for this contention, for as the court pointed out, the contract embraced virtually the entire state of Georgia, and included areas in which the employer had never conducted business at all. In order that the contract be held
reasonable, the restrictions must be confined to the territory in which the employer carries on his business. Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269,
289 S. W. 295 (1926). In considering the question of whether the territorial limitations in the case at hand were too extensive, the court found no case in point
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within the jurisdiction. Stating that in the majority of cases in which it had held
such covenants valid, the restrictions had been confined to cities or towns, the
court said that it had never yet held lawful an employment contract even approaching the dimensions embraced in the case under consideration. Nor did
counsel for plaintiff offer any such cases in support of its position.
With respect to the ruling sustaining the demurrer, the court held this error,
inasmuch as the contract was unduly harsh and oppressive and tended to deprive the employee of the right to make use of the experience and knowledge
gained in such employment. The ease with which such contracts may be terminated by the employer would render any other rule inequitable and ineffective.
The employee has nothing but his labor to sell, and more often than not, he is
not in a position to be selective, whereas the employer generally is. In Union
Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill. 420, 61 N. E. 1038 (1901), it was said:
The reason for the rule is, that it is against the policy of the state
that te people of the whole state should be deprived of the industry and
skill of a party in an employment useful to the public, and he should be
compelled either to engage in other business or abandon his citizenship
of the state and remove elsewhere in order to support himself and family.
Arising from this deprivation is the possibility that the employee and his children may consequently become dependent on the state. The duty of the court is of
paramount importance in instances of this nature, for as was aptly stated in Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370, 22 Atl. 348, (1891):
To many persons the right to labor is the most important and valuable right they possess. It is their fortune; constituting the only means
they have to obtain food, raiment, and shelter, and to acquire property.
To such persons a deprivation of this right is ruin, and to abridge it is to
do them an injury which will very likely result in their ruin. When, therefore, a court is asked to deprive a person of this right, or to abridge it,
it is its duty before it acts, to considei with the utmost care whether, if
it does what it is asked to do, it will not, on a careful comparison of
consequences, do more injustice than justice.
By way of illustration, the court in the instant case drew a comparison between
cases involving contracts of sale as distinguished from contracts of employment.
Recognizing the fact that broader restraint is permitted in cases relating to a sale
of business, the court cited the Hood case, supra, where it was stated by Judge
Gilbert, drawing rather extensive from 6 R.C.L. 793 (1929):
There are several reasons for upholding a covenant on the part of
the vendor in all cases to desist from the business in competition with
the purchaser, which do not obtain in other cases ... the vendor receives
an equivalent for his partial abstention from that business, in the increased
price paid him for it on account of his covenant; and his entering into and
observance of the covenant not only do not tend to his pauperization to
the detriment of the public, but on the contrary, by securing to him the
full value of his business and its good wi...
the covenant operates to
his affirmative pecuniary benefit and against his impoverishment ....
On the other hand, in the Rakestraw case, which involved an employment contract,
it was said that restrictive covenants:
. . . tend to injure the parties making them, diminish their means of procuring livelihoods and a competency for their families; tempt improvident
persons, for the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power
to make future acquisitions, and expose them to imposition and oppression;
tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and
capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well
as to themselves.
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The judgment of the trial court in restraining the defendant from working in
areas he had covered while employed by plaintiff would have rendered adequate
justice among all, had the contract not been otherwise unreasonable. In granting
the injunction, it apparently failed to devote sufficient attention to the other attendant circumstances which tended to shroud the entire agreement with ad unlawful taint.
The fact that a contract embraces more territory than reasonably necessary for
the protection of the employer does not preclude it from being enforced to the extent of the separability of its lawful provisions. Equity will grant relief where
the contract is clearly divisible, if the circumstances of the case warrant it. New
England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N. E. (2d) 997 (1940);
Consolidated Syrup Corp. v. Kaiser, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 307 (1940). In requiring
employees to sign such covenants, however, employers are quite often tempted to
include provisions more excessive than reasonably necessary for their protection,
feeling confident that at least adequate relief will be granted, and possibly a bit
more.
Aside from the unreasonable territorial feature involved, the court found the
contract "otherwise unreasonable" and contrary to public policy under the particular
facts of the case. Taking cognizance of the purpose for which the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act, 58 STAT. 284 (1944), 38 U.S.C. § 693 et seq. (1946), was intended, it stated that the result of such a contract as this would be the waste of
public money expended in training the veteran. Among the other things that influenced its decision were, (a) the representation of the plaintiff to the Veterans'
Administration office that there was reasonable certainty that employment would be
available to the veteran upon completion of his training, (b) the Veterans' Administration's ignorance of the contract clause, which it would not have sanctioned
had it known the facts, and (c) the fact that the trainee's knowledge and experience
gained in such employment would have been of no practical value to him and to
the state if not permitted to use it. To substantiate its holding in this respect, it
declared:
It is manifest that the provisions of the Servicemen's Readjustmenc
Act .. . were intended to furnish to veterans on-the-job training in order
to speedily provide for their employment in a gainful occupation, to reduce the problem of unemployment among returning veterans, and to
assure the veterans, provided with on-the-job training, of a reasonable
certainty of using that training in a gainful occuption.
In support of its reasoning, -the court cited Robinson v. Reynolds, 194 Ga. 324,
21 S. E. (2d) 214 (1942), as stating the applicable rule governing such cases. There
it was held: "Contracts that obviously and directly tend in a marked degree to
bring about results that the law seeks to prevent cannot be made the ground of
a successful suit."
The decision of the court was sound in every respect. The policy of the
American courts is to look with disfavor on agreements which are too oppressive
or unreasonable, and which are inimical to the public welfare. Consequently, the
courts strictly interpret bargains or contracts restricting competition, and are usually inclined to hold that the paticular act sought to be enjoined does not constitute an actionable breach. The purpose of any covenant of this type is to lessen
competition with the covenantee, and to secure as great an advantage for him
as possible. Thus, contracts of this nature naturally tend to eliminate competitors
from the field and discourage contenders in such a manner that the necessary stimulus required to keep a healthy competitive business on its toes becomes either
non-existent or is reduced to a state of feeble activity. The resultant consequences
lead to but one thing: monopoly. Thus the law seeks to discourage and prohibit
such contracts.
Cyril C. Vidra
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Tamburello v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co., 38 So. (2d) 668 (La.
App. 1949). Suit was brought by the bailee, on a quantum meruit basis, to recover for storage of an old, dilapidated truck.
In 1938 the plaintiff, operator df an automobile parking garage, verbally agreed
with the defendant, a furniture store partnership, to permit the latter to.park three
of the furniture store trucks in the plaintiff's establishment. The price agreed upon
was a flat rate of nineteen dollars per month. In 1939, one of the aforementioned
trucks became completely unusable, and was placed in a vacant lot belonging
to the plaintiff adjoining the enclosed garage. The defendant's other two trucks,
with one or more automobiles, continued to use the parking facilities. The defendant was well aware of the disposition taken as to the third truck. In 1947,
after a disagreement between the parties, the defendant withdrew his vehicles
from the plaintiff's establishment with the exception of the dilapidated truck which
was left in the lot. All bills were paid up to that time.
Sometime thereafter the plaintiff sent the defendant a bill for ten dollars for
one month's storage of the old -truck. The evidence is vague as to the exact action
the defendant advised the plaintiff to take, but it was in effect that the plaintiff
might dispose of the truck in any manner that he chose, as the truck was worthless
to the defendant. The plaintiff refused to dispose of the truck and continued to
send the defendant monthly storage bills of ten dollars per month which were
ignored completely until this suit was brought eleven months later.
The court held that the defense, as to an authorization to dispose of the truck,
was not supported by sufficient evidence. Thus the plaintiff was under no duty
and had no right to dispose of the truck, but the defendant was under a duty
to remove the truck from the lot or dispose of it in some way. The plaintiff
had rendered services for the defendant in keeping the truck upon his lot. The
court further held that by leaving the truck on the lot after notification that
monthly storage charges were being imposed, the defendant tacitly agreed to the
rate charged and was liable for that amount. Quantum meruit was said to lie
for a larger amount than the value of the truck stored because the space occupied
by the truck was as valuable to the plaintiff as if used by a valuable truck.
Recovery on quantum meruit is allowed without regard to the intention or
assent of the parties bound, but is dictated by reason and justice. The action was
devised to allow recovery for benefits conferred, not gratuitously, but under circumstances precluding an implication of mutual assent. It is a contract implied
in law to prevent unjust enrichment of the recipient at the expense of the plaintiff. 4 Am. Jua., Assumpsit § 5; 58 Am. Jun., Work a~ud Labor § 2.
Upon termination of the bailment contract, in regard to the parking privileges
of the three trucks, the plaintiff became a gratuitous bailee of the dilapidated
truck. It was not the plaintiff's duty to remove the truck or dispose of it. He
was held to have received no authority to do so. The plaintiff could have terminated the bailment by giving reasonable notice to the bailor (defendant) so that
he would have opportunity to remove the truck. Upon tender and refusal to receive, the bailee (plaintiff) might lawfully have removed the truck from his premises or have it stored elsewhere at the risk and expense of the bailor. Roulston v.
McClelland, 2 Smith 60 (N. Y. 1853); Dalev. Brinkerhofl, 7 Daly 45 (N. Y. 1877);
Weinstein v. Sheer, 98 N. J. L. 511, 120 .AtL 679 (1923).
In order to change a gratuitous bailment to a bailment for storage or for
compensation, the bailee must either notify the bailor, G. A. Crancer Co. v. Combs,
95 Neb. 403, 145 N. W. 863 (1914), or be reasonably certain that the bailor has
knowledge of the situation and reasonable opportunity to remove the goods or
subject himself to storage fees, Christopher v. Jerdee, 152 Wis. 367, 139 N. W.
1132 (1913). Generally, an offeree need make no reply to offers, and his silence
T

